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I. Introduction
Human rights advocates have long sought greater accountability for
violations of international human rights law.' The primary obstacle has been
the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms; despite numerous treaties and
customary international human rights norms, human rights abuses are still
commonplace in many countries. 2 Further, no international tribunal typically
has jurisdiction over human rights claims.3 In 1980, the federal courts began
using the Alien Tort Statute4 (ATS) to hold perpetrators of egregious human
rights offenses liable in civil suits, thus opening a new avenue for victims to
seek redress and expose their wrongdoers.5 The ATS states that the "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
1. See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATIoN
IN U.S. COuRTS 3-4 (1996) (noting that activists have sought for US. courts to recognize
international human rights norms).
2. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 457,458 (2001) (discussing human rights abuses).
3. See id. (addressing the current state of human rights litigation).
4. The Alien Tort Statute can also be referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act.
5. See Beth Stephens, Remarks, in The Alien Tort Claims Act Under Attack, 98 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 49,51 (2004) (noting that the landmarkFilartiga v. Pena-Irala decision in
1980 offered the victims of egregious human rights abuses the opportunity to hold perpetrators
liable).
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States.',6 Although the early post-1980 cases involved mostly official state
actors (government ministers and police chiefs for example), plaintiffs have
increasingly filed ATS suits against multinational corporations (MNCs).
7
The shift in focus to corporate defendants arises from the reality that MNCs
have the deep pockets to pay damages.8 A plaintiff, however, has yet to
receive judgment against a corporation. 9 The lower federal courts have
routinely upheld jurisdiction over corporations, but plaintiffs continue to fail
to defeat motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Suits typically fail to
allege sufficiently the requisite state action or an actionable violation of
international law.' 0 Most federal courts have required an actionable violation
to be universal, specific, and obligatory." Despite the lack of successful
ATS suits against MNCs, the business community has cried foul, asserting
that the ATS is judicial imperialism run amok that poses dramatic risks to
international commerce.' 2 MNCs fear they could be held liable simply for
doing business in, paying taxes to, or investing in a country with a poor
human rights record.' 3 The State Department has also expressed concern that
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
7. See Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost ofAlien Tort Litigation: A Response to
Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 7 (2004)
(noting that since the mid-1990s ATS jurisprudence has been dominated by cases against
MNCs).
8. See Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and
Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 433,437 (2002) ("The number of cases filed increased
rapidly once it became possible to sue corporations, in part because such defendants are far
more likely than individual foreigners to have assets to pay a judgment.").
9. See Stephens, supra note 5, at 52 (discussing plaintiffs' lack of success against
corporations).
10. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 172 (2d Cir. 2003)
(dismissing claim for failure to submit sufficient evidence that intranational pollution violates
customary international law); Ge v. Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (dismissing
ATS claim for failure to allege substantial degree of cooperation between defendant corporation
and Chinese government to establish state action).
11. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth
these requirements).
12. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, INST. FOR INT'L ECON.,
AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 9 (2003) ("Unless checked, the
ATS could lead U.S. courts to become judicial instruments of imperial overstretch .... "); id. at
7 (stating that ATS litigation threatens to spin out of control with suits targeting more than 50
MNCs for over $200 billion in damages).
13. See Francisco Rivera, A Response to the Corporate Campaign Against the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 251,259 (2003) (discussing the concerns expressed
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that ATS litigation may discourage overseas investment).
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pursuing claims involving foreign governments may hamper the war on
terrorism.14
The Supreme Court, in 2004, addressed the scope of the ATS for the
first time in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 15 The Sosa case, however, involved an
alleged human rights violation committed by an official state actor, not an
MNC. 16 The Court failed to lay out specific guidelines for what constitutes
an actionable international norm under the ATS. The Court required that any
violations must be as universally accepted and defined as the eighteenth
century international norms that the First Congress likely intended the ATS to
address. 17 Unfortunately, the Court did not engage in any analysis of the
scope of these eighteenth century offenses or how the lower courts might
practically compare international norms separated by over two hundred years.
In addition to its transhistorical test, the Court admonished lower courts to
exercise caution in granting new causes of action under the ATS. The Court
gave two main reasons for this caution: (1) the role of the federal judiciary in
creating new common law has shifted dramatically in the last century, and the
courts have demonstrated great restraint in finding new causes of action
without congressional direction; and (2) there is concern that the ATS
enables the judiciary to encroach upon the foreign policy powers of the
legislative and executive branches.
18
The Sosa decision did not directly answer the most pertinent questions
when addressing the liability of corporations under the ATS: (1) Are
corporations legitimate defendants?; (2) If so, what international norms are
actionable?; and (3) Under what standards will liability be determined? This
Note attempts to offer the practical guidance to the lower federal courts that
the Supreme Court failed to give. MNCs should be liable to the extent that
they violate an actionable international norm. As juridical persons, it appears
illogical to exempt them from liability for offenses that they have the capacity
14. See id. at 256-57 (noting that the State Department has expressed its desire to see
litigation involving Indonesia dismissed for fear that adjudication would threaten the struggle
against terrorism).
15. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004) (holding that plaintiff's
ATS claim of arbitrary arrest did not allege a sufficient violation of international law); infra Part
III for a discussion of the Sosa case.
16. See id. at 2746 (stating that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) hired Sosa, among
others, to abduct Alvarez-Machain and hand him over to DEA officials).
17. See id. at 2765 ("[F]ederal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance ... than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.").
18. See id. at 2762-64 (discussing the reasons for judicial caution when considering ATS
claims).
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to commit. Moreover, since World War II, international law has clearly
recognized the liability of nonstate actors. Although corporations, like
private individuals, do not have equal status with states on the international
plane, they still have international duties and responsibilities. ' 9 The immense
wealth and power of MNCs give them the ability to influence the actions and
policies of developing countries. With this influence also comes the ability to
commit serious human rights violations. The Sosa decision cautioned against
interfering with the foreign policy prerogatives of the political branches that
can certainly arise in the context of U.S. MNCs doing business with foreign
nations. Federal courts, however, have several doctrines to dismiss
inappropriate cases. 20 That foreign policy concerns may arise should not lead
to a blanket immunity for corporations.
In light of the Court's strict requirements and its pleas for caution, this
Note advocates that actionable norms should be limited to jus cogens
2
1
violations of human rights law. By limiting violations tojus cogens norms,
the federal courts greatly reduce the risk of incurring foreign policy concerns,
as jus cogens norms are by definition universal, obligatory, and
nonderogable. This Note argues that the Court's transhistorical test is
generally vague and unworkable, particularly in light of the Court's failure to
offer practical guidance. Jus cogens norms offer lower courts a workable test
that also addresses the Court's concern for the universal acceptance and
definiteness of any actionable norm. Thejus cogens norms that lower courts
should recognize include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
slavery, piracy, torture, and extrajudicial killing-norms that lower courts
have almost unanimously agreed to uphold. Furthermore, this Note asserts
that the standards for assessing ATS liability, in addition to agency law and
under-color-of-law jurisprudence, should arise from federal tort law and not
from international standards such as aiding and abetting. The aiding and
abetting standard is relatively new and has not obtained the level of assent
required by the Court's opinion. Moreover, the ATS does not require that the
ancillary issues surrounding an applicable violation of international law also
be drawn from international law. Federal courts have a broad and well-
developed body of law addressing tort liability that is applicable to human
rights offenses.
19. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 445 (discussing individual rights and duties under
international law).
20. See discussion, infra notes 130-32 (discussing these doctrines).
21. For a definition ofjus cogens and its place in international law, see the discussion
below in Part II.A.
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II. Historical and Conceptual Framework of the Alien Tort Statute (A TS)
A. Relevant Concepts and Terminology of International Law
Substantive public international law 22 derives from two principal sources:
(1) customary international law, and (2) agreements entered into between states,
such as treaties.23 Customary international law is the modern term for "the law
of nations," which the ATS refers to as the nontreaty source of international
law.24 Customary international laws are binding norms that arise from the
"general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation [opiniojuris].''25 Thus, practices adopted for moral or political
reasons, without a corresponding legal duty, do not give rise to norms of
customary international law.26 Although no set duration exists for a norm to
develop into customary international law, the last half century has seen a shift
that now accepts-development of customary international law within a relatively
brief period.2 7 Within customary international law, an "elite" subset exists,
classified as jus cogens norms.28 Jus cogens norms differ from ordinary
22. Public international law consists of the rules and norms that regulate the interactions
between states and other entities that are accorded international legal personality. See REBECCA
M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (4th ed. 2002) (defining international law). Private
international law, also known as conflict of laws, is a system of law that is a part of a state's
domestic law; it is used to determine how conflicts of laws and jurisdiction are to be resolved.
See id. at 1 n. 1 (distinguishing private international law). All references to international law in
this Note, unless otherwise stated, will refer to public international law.
23. See id. at 3 (identifying sources of international law). This Note focuses on customary
international law as opposed to treaties as a source of actionable claims under the ATS, and thus
will not address the nature and scope of treaty law.
24. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140,153-54 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
"the law of nations" in the ATS refers to the body of law known as customary international law).
25. See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
23 (2004) (alteration in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987)); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice,
U.N. CHARTER, art. 38, para. I (stating that "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law" is included in the body of law addressed by the International Court of
Justice).
26. See Flores, 343 F.3d at 154 (discussing the development of customary international
law).
27. See WALLACE, supra note 22, at 10 (noting that a brief period of state practice does
not bar a norm from customary status if the other requirements are met); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. Rv. 815, 838-39 (1997) (noting that the traditional conception
of customary international law required the passage of a substantial time period before a practice
became legally binding).
28. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
(describing jus cogens as an elite subset of the norms considered as customary international
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customary international law in that they are nonderogable, and thus any treaty
or law that conflicts with them is invalid.2 9 These norms comprise the most
universal and egregious violations of customary international law such as
genocide, war crimes, torture, slavery, crimes against humanity, and
extrajudicial killing.3°
B. Brief History of the A TS
Originally passed by the First Congress as a part of the Judiciary Act of
1789,31 the current version of the ATS reads: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 32 Despite
considerable attention, legal historians and the Supreme Court have failed to
reach a definitive conclusion on the intended purpose and scope of the ATS.33
For nearly 200 years after its passage in 1789, the ATS essentially lay dormant
as only two suits successfully obtained jurisdiction under § 1350, one in 1795
and the other in 1961. This all changed in 1980 with the birth of the modem
ATS human rights case in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.35
law).
29. See WALLACE, supra note 22, at 33 (discussingjus cogens).
30. See infra note 176 (citing to various sources that listjus cogens offenses).
31. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,2755 (2004) (discussing the history of
the ATS).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
33. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2758 (concluding "that despite considerable scholarly
attention, it is fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has proven
elusive"); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the
ATS does not have a legislative history that could provide insight into the First Congress's
intent).
34. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (citing these cases).
35. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that deliberate
torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates customary international law and that
28 U.S.C. § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction over an alleged torturer found within the United
States's borders). In Filartiga, the appellants were Paraguayan citizens who sued Pena-Irala, an
Inspector General of Police, under the ATS for the alleged kidnapping, torture, and murder of
their son and brother in 1976. Id. The central issue in Filartiga was whether official torture
constituted a violation of the law of nations that, if it did, would establish federal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Id. at 880. The Filartiga court found that courts must interpret
international law as it has evolved and currently exists among modern nations and not as it was
in 1789 when the ATS was passed. Id. at 881. The Filartiga court relied upon numerous
international agreements, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, and the International
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The Filartiga decision was significant in that a United States court
recognized how the modern view of international law has dramatically shifted
from a view that once held insignificant the role of individuals (or any nonstate
entities) as actors under the law of nations.36 Prior to the twentieth century, the
idea that individuals could make claims based upon international law was
heretical.37 But the Filartiga court asserted that this view no longer holds; how
a state treats its own citizens is now a matter of international concern.38 This
rationale reflects the trend in the twentieth century, particularly since World
War II, of multinational efforts to build a law of human rights and to provide
remedies for breaches of that law. 39 Even more significant than elevating the
role of the individual in international law, the Filartiga decision opened the
gates for foreign nationals to pursue human rights claims in U.S. courts.
40
Filartiga not only held that customary international law must be interpreted and
applied in its current state, 4' but also that customary international law is a part
of federal common law, which gave the ATS a constitutional foundation.42 The
combination of these two holdings invited litigants from around the world to
use the federal courts to redefine the scope of human rights claims within
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to determine that officially sanctioned torture violates
established international human rights norms, and thus the law of nations. Id. at 882-84. The
Filartiga court construed the ATS "not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening
the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law." Id. at
887.
36. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in THE ALIEN
TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 49, 59 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony
D'Amato eds., 1999) (noting that a growing positivization of international law in the nineteenth
century and an emphasis on state sovereignty essentially removed individuals from any role
under the law of nations).
37. See id. at 60 (noting that under the classical system of international law those who
violate a fellow citizen's human rights are answerable only to the state and not to the
international legal order).
38. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (citing the United Nations Charter (a treaty of the
United States) for the idea that human rights and fundamental freedoms are of universal
concern); see also id. at 884 (overruling precedent that suggested that international law is not
violated when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state, declaring that such a
proposition is "clearly out of tune with the current.. . practice of international law").
39. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 36, at 61-62 (discussing this trend).
40. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 461 (1989) (noting that Filartiga lent weight to
President Carter's human rights policy and opened a new avenue for human rights litigation).
41. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,881 (2dCir. 1980) (stating that international
law must be applied as it exists today).
42. See id. at 885 (holding that the ATS's constitutional basis is that the law of nations
has always been a part of federal common law).
1226
ALIEN TORTTA TUTE AFTER SOSA v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 1227
customary international law.43 Over the past twenty-five years, aliens have
asserted a wide array of claims under the ATS.44
The central holdings of Filartiga and its progeny-that the ATS is
constitutional, that it creates a cause of action, that international law is
interpreted contemporaneously and not historically, and that it applies to acts
committed outside the United States-have been widely followed by several
circuits, including most prominently the Second and Ninth Circuits,45 but also
by the Fifth46 and Eleventh47 Circuits. The District of Columbia Circuit in
several concurring opinions, however, has criticized the modem interpretation
of the ATS.48 While the predominant position of the lower courts has been to
43. See id. at 884-85 (noting that the treaties cited demonstrate that international law
confers fundamental rights upon all people from their governments and that while the exact
scope of those rights has yet to be determined, the right to be free from torture is now among
them); see also Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 111, 116 (2004)
(stating that Filartiga created a far-reaching tool for foreigners asserting a variety of human
rights abuses).
44. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999)
(alleging environmental damage from mining activities); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d
1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (suing for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of
funds); Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 111 (5th Cir. 1988) (claiming
defendants aided and abetted torture in foreign prison); Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 319
(5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (alleging tortious conversion of property); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (D.N.J. 1999) (alleging forced labor); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation
Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1998) (suing for violations of crimes against humanity, war
crimes, hijacking, and sexual slavery).
45. See JOSEPH, supra note 25, at 58 (noting that since Filartiga, the Second Circuit and
Ninth Circuit in numerous cases, as well as the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits have followed the
central holdings of Filartiga).
46. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161,165 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
Filartiga for the notion that international law must be applied in its current state and not as it
was defined in 1789 for ATS purposes).
47. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1 th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
ATS "establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to
give effect to violations of customary international law").
48. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (finding that the ATS does not provide for a private right of action nor
does international law supply one under federal common law and criticizing notions that the
phrase "law of nations" in the ATS must be read as incorporating all the modem rules of
international law); see also Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Randolph, J., concurring) (questioning the constitutionality of Filartiga's theory that federal
common law incorporates customary international law), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.
Ct. 2686 (2004); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 826 n.5 (Robb, J., concurring) (deciding that the
Filartiga decision "appears... to be fundamentally at odds with the reality of the international
structure and with the role of United States courts within that structure").
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follow the Filartiga line of cases, 49 the decision nevertheless provoked
considerable controversy and scholarship, concerning whether the ATS merely
grants jurisdiction over offenses defined elsewhere or whether it also provides a
cause of action on the basis of customary international law.5 ° As discussed
below in Part III, the Sosa decision endorsed aspects of both sides of the debate
and created as much confusion as certainty.5 ' In many ways, the Sosa Court
punted the ATS back to the lower federal courts with limited guidance. This
Note intends to respond to and fill some of the gaping holes left in Sosa's wake.
III. The Sosa Decision: Looking to the Eighteenth Century
A. Factual and Procedural History
In 1985, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), was captured while operating in Mexico. 2 His
capturers tortured him during a two day interrogation and then murdered him. 53
DEA officials believed Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician,
participated in the torture by keeping the agent alive during the interrogations.5 4
A federal grand jury indicted Alvarez in 1990 for his role in the torture and
murder of Camarena-Salazar, but the Mexican government refused to assist the
DEA in bringing Alvarez to the United States for trial." The DEA
subsequently employed Mexican nationals, including petitioner Jose Fernando
Sosa, to abduct Alvarez and fly him to El Paso, Texas, where federal officers
arrested him.
5 6
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted
Alvarez's motion to dismiss the indictment because it violated the extradition
49. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that the core principles of
Filartiga have been adopted with only minor deviations).
50. See Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 117-18 (noting the considerable controversy post-
Filartiga that debates whether the ATS is a source of substantive law or whether it is better seen
as solely jurisdictional); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 817 (rejecting the
"modem" position that customary international law is a part of federal common law).
51. See Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 118 (stating that "[l]ike Santa Claus, the [Sosa]
opinion brought something for everyone," partially endorsing the differing scholarly
interpretations of the ATS).
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treaty between the United States and Mexico; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but
the Supreme Court reversed.57 At trial in 1992, the District Court granted
Alvarez's motion for a judgment of acquittal.58 In 1993, Alvarez filed a civil
action against Sosa under the ATS and against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 59 The District Court awarded summary
judgment and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.60
B. Interpreting the A TS: The Sosa Opinion
1. A Transhistorical Standard
The Supreme Court rejected Alvarez's argument that the ATS granted
authority to create new causes of action for torts violating international law in
addition to its jurisdictional grant.6' Despite holding that the ATS is solely
jurisdictional, the Court did not agree with Sosa that the statute was "stillborn"
and thus required subsequent legislation to provide a cause of action. 62 Further,
based upon the historical record, the Court found "that Congress intended the
ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging
violations of the law of nations, 63 and that the common law would provide the
requisite cause of action for those violations "with a potential for personal
liability at the time.'"64 The Court found that the First Congress in 1789 likely
intended those violations to include safe conducts, infringements of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy-and found no basis to suspect that the First
Congress contemplated any torts beyond these three offenses (Blackstone's
offenses).65
57. See id. (noting that the Court held that "the fact of Alvarez's forcible seizure did not
affect the jurisdiction of a federal court"). For the Court's opinion in the criminal proceedings,
see United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
58. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004).
59. See id. at 2747 (noting that Alvarez alleged false arrest against the United States and a
violation of the law of nations against Sosa).
60. Id. The FTCA claim is beyond the scope of this Note. The District Court dismissed
the FTCA claim, which the Ninth Circuit reversed; the Supreme Court affirmed the District
Court's dismissal. Id.
61. See id. at 2755 (stating that Alvarez's reading of the ATS is "implausible").
62. Id. "There is too much in the historical record to believe that Congress would have
enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely." Id. at 2758-59.
63. Id. at 2759.
64. Id.at2761.
65. Id. at 2759-61. The Court drew upon Blackstone's eighteenth century Commentaries
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To this point, the Court's opinion was relatively straightforward. The
ATS is solely jurisdictional and Congress intended Blackstone's offenses to
supply the causes of action through the common law. But then the Court took a
large step forward and invited federal courts to create new causes of action
based upon modem international law. The Court required any claim "to rest on
a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 1 8th-century paradigms we
have recognized., 66 Despite its invitation, the Court gave five reasons for
federal courts to exercise caution before recognizing new claims. First, the
conception of the common law has changed dramatically in the last two
centuries from naturalistic to positivistic; modem law is not considered found
or discovered but rather created or made.67 The second reason followed closely
from this conceptional change in the common law: Federal courts have
generally looked to the legislature for guidance before "exercising innovative
authority over substantive law., 68 Third, the Court has repeatedly held that, in
the absence of express congressional intent to create a private right of action,
the Court is reluctant to create such a right.69 Even though Congress's failure
to provide a private right of action under an international norm is more
equivocal than its failure to create such a right under a domestic statute, the
potential consequences of making international law actionable by individuals
supports judicial caution.70 The fourth reason concerned the potential impact
on United States foreign policy, which is primarily the domain of the executive
and legislative branches. 71 American courts sitting in judgment of foreign
governments or their agents risk jeopardizing the foreign policy of the political
branches.72 Finally, in light of the previous four reasons, the Court emphasized
as the primary source to define these "specific offenses against the law of nations addressed by
the criminal law of England." Id. at 2756. They will hereinafter be referred to as Blackstone's
offenses.
66. Id. at 2761-62.
67. See id. at 2762 (noting that when Congress enacted the ATS, the common law was
seen as "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it
unless and until changed by statute") (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
68. See id. (declaring that "[i]t would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role in
exercising ajurisdiction that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries").
69. Id. at 2763.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. (stating that because of the potential foreign policy risks, remedies for
international norm violations "should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution") (emphasis
added).
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that Congress has given the judiciary no mandate to seek out and define new
and debatable violations of international law.73
The Court gave limited guidance to lower courts on how to apply its
opinion., The Court itself did not even recognize a final standard: "Whatever
the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action.., federal courts should
not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when Section 1350 was
enacted. 7 4 The Sosa Court supplied a transhistorical test with some modern
caveats attached. By not establishing ultimate criteria, the Court implied that
meeting the eighteenth century paradigm may not be sufficient to create a new
cause of action. Even more, the Court did not offer a single example of a
modern norm that would meet this transhistorical test. Further, the Court
required a consideration of the practical consequences of creating a cause of
action litigable in federal courts.75 For example, the Court asserted that one
limiting factor may be the need to defer to the political branches on a case-
specific basis.76 Several pending suits seek damages under the ATS from
corporations alleged to have aided or abetted the apartheid regime that formerly
controlled South Africa.77 The current South African government insisted that
these suits interfered with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission's goal to
avoid "victors' justice"; the United States State Department agreed with South
Africa.7 8 In such circumstances, the Court found that a strong argument existed
for the federal judiciary to give significant weight to the executive branch's
views on a suit's foreign policy impact.79
By generally endorsing the reasoning of several lower courts, the Court
offered some indication how the historical standard might be applied. The
common factors mandate that any international norm must be specific,
universal, and obligatory.80  For example, the Court endorsed Filartiga's
73. See id. (noting that this reason is important in light of the second reason that the
judiciary's general role is not to create substantive law).
74. Id. at 2765 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 2766.
76. Id. at 2766 n.21.
77. Id. (citing In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2002)).
The South African apartheid cases have since been dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538,557
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing plaintiffs' cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
ATS). See the discussion of this important post-Sosa case in Part V below.
78. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 (2004).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2765-66 (citing approvingly In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
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statement regarding universality that "for the purposes of civil liability, the
torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."'
The Sosa Court's apparent endorsement of the hostis humani generis
concept is ironic considering the Court's transhistorical standard. The term
hostis humani generis originated within the common law tradition in the mid-
seventeenth century. 2 Seventeenth century writers applied the term to pirates
who indiscriminately attacked the ships of all nations, and not to those who
targeted ships with the flags of particular nations.83 The term's origins,
therefore, do not contemplate the egregiousness of the substantive offense-
robbing ships on the high seas-but rather its indiscriminate manner. The fact
that robbery on the high seas was condoned when a privateer had a letter of
marque further evidences this conclusion. 84 Certainly, no modem day torturer
or slave trader would be excused based upon state approval or discrimination as
to the victims. Modem courts, as evidenced by Filartiga, have transformed the
term's core meaning to one of moral repugnance which surely describes
incidents of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and other
violations. The irony of the Sosa opinion, however, is that it endorsed a faulty
comparison of modem human rights law to eighteenth century piracy-just the
type of transhistorical comparison the Court has asked lower courts to
undertake. Furthermore, the Court's lack of any transhistorical analysis maybe
a harbinger of how lower courts will interpret and apply the Sosa decision.
Indeed, the Southern District of New York failed to apply any transhistorical
analysis to the In re South African Apartheid Litigation85 case, a major
corporate ATS suit decided only five months after Sosa.
Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific,
universal, and obligatory.") and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the limits of the ATS be defined by "a
handful of heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory
norms")).
81. See id. at 2766 (quoting with approval Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
82. See ALFRED P. RuBN, THE LAW OF PRACy 92 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that hostis humani
generis first appeared in England in 1644).
83. See id. at 93-94 (noting that hostis humani generis applied to those who "robbed the
merchants of all nations without discrimination by flag" and not to those who only attacked the
ships of one or two nations).
84. See Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 145-46 (noting that a "letter of marque authorized
its bearer to attack and seize civilian ships on the high seas---essentially the same conduct that
constituted piracy... [y]et the privateer... was not guilty of any crime").
85. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting Sosa's transhistorical standard yet not engaging in any such analysis and instead
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It is worth noting that the facts of Alvarez's claim do not represent the
typical ATS claim. Alvarez alleged an arbitrary arrest that lasted for less than
one day, after which he was transferred to the custody of lawful authorities and
promptly arraigned. 86 ATS cases tend to involve more egregious and heinous
violations of human rights, such as severe torture, extrajudicial killing,87
genocide,88 ethnic cleansing, 89 crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 90 The
arbitrary arrest in Sosa was not a borderline case and thus did not provide the
applying the Second Circuit's standard for norms that are universally accepted and followed out
of legal obligation). In Apartheid Litigation, the plaintiffs were South African citizens who
brought suit under the ATS against a group of multinational corporations who conducted
business in apartheid South Africa. Id. at 542. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
corporations supplied resources, including technology, money, and oil, to the apartheid South
African government or to entities controlled by the government. Id. at 544-45. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants were liable for international law violations committed by the
government, such as genocide, torture, forced labor, racial discrimination, and extrajudicial
killings. Id. at 548. The plaintiffs attempted to link defendants to the violations in three ways:
(1) that defendants were state actors while committing the violations; (2) that defendants aided
and abetted the government in committing the violations; and (3) that defendants' business
activities were sufficient to constitute an actionable norm under the ATS. Id. at 548. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim. Id. at 542. The court found that the defendant corporations were not state actors under
the color of law jurisprudence and stated that "[a]t most.., defendants benefited from the
unlawful state action of the apartheid government." Id. at 548-49. As to aiding and abetting,
the court rejected assertions that the findings of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda or the Nuremberg trials established a universally accepted and
well-defined norm for ATS purposes. Id. at 549-50. Finally, the court found that a proscription
on conducting business with an apartheid regime was not an international norm followed by
states out of legal obligation. Id. at 552-53. Finding no legal connection between defendants
actions and the alleged violations, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 554.
86. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004).
87. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
plaintiffs allege that defendants directly or indirectly subjected Myanmarese villagers to forced
labor, murder, rape, and torture), reh'ggranted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that plaintiffs alleged that a police official
tortured and killed their relative for opposing Paraguay's president); Estate of Rodriguez v.
Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (alleging company allowed
paramilitaries to commit extrajudicial killings of union organizers).
88. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (alleging that former
Bosnian-Serb president committed acts of genocide, rape, forced prostitution, and torture).
89. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 01 CV. 9882,2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17030, at * I (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,2004) (mem.) (alleging company's complicity in
government's brutal ethnic cleansing campaign in connection with extraction of Sudanese oil).
90. See Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2003)
(alleging Algerian paramilitary groups committed crimes against humanity and war crimes
including extrajudicial killings and an airline hijacking), appeal dismissed, No. 03-7072, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 13908 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2003).
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Court an opportunity to explore the boundaries of ATS claims. The Court
tacitly approved the reasoning in several cases that involved the more egregious
and heinous violations,91 but it did not give an opinion regarding whether these
violations are actionable. Lower courts are left to speculate where the Court
would draw the line based on its analysis of the Sosa facts.
2. Evaluating the Alleged Violation in Sosa
The limited guidance the Court offered can be seen in its analysis of
Alvarez's arbitrary detention claim. Although the analysis did not further
elucidate the transhistorical test, the Court discussed some aspects of a clearly
invalid claim. The Court evaluated Alvarez's ATS claim under the current
state of international law and not any historically bound version of it, even
though historical principles may inform the analysis. 92 A key element to
ascertaining current international law is determining its positivistic element-
what states actually practice, as opposed to the normative element (what
individuals think the law should be).93 Alvarez cited two international
agreements, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(I.C.C.P.R.), to establish the applicable international law regarding arbitrary
arrest.94 Both agreements failed the Sosa test's need for an obligatory norm.
91. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765-66 (stating that the Court's standard is "generally
consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it
reached this Court").
92. See id. at 2766 (noting that the arbitrary arrest claim "must be gauged against the
current state of international law, looking to those sources we have long, albeit cautiously,
recognized").
93. See id. at 2766-67 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), for the
proposition that international law must be determined by the customary use of states and not
what some think the law ought to be). In The Paquete Habana, the Court laid out the
framework for determining the current state of international law:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works ofjurists and commentators, who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not
for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
94. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004) (noting that Alvarez
alleged his abduction was an arbitrary arrest within the meaning of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and traced the rule to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
which the United States is a party).
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The Universal Declaration imposes no legal obligations upon its signatory
states-rather, it is a statement of principles. 95 Although the I.C.C.P.R. binds
the United States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the
treaty with the express understanding that it did not create enforceable rights in
federal courts.96 The lack of a congressionally enacted private right of action
does not foreclose the norms embodied in a treaty from being actionable;
however, the lack of congressional action prevents the treaty itself from
establishing the applicable international norm.9 7 The Court's rejection of these
two treaties demonstrates that no matter the lofty moral authority of an alleged
source of international law, without a corresponding legal obligation the source
fails to create an actionable offense under the ATS.
Alvarez also attempted to establish that the prohibition against arbitrary
arrest has become binding customary international law.98 But the Court found
little authority to support his broad definition of prohibited arbitrary detention:
"[O]fficially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain under
the domestic law of some government, regardless of the circumstances. '" 99 To
support that definition would allow aliens to sue in federal court for any arrest,
in any country, that exceeded the authority of the arresting individual.'00 No
norm of customary international law is sufficiently specific to support an action
for unlawful detention of less than one day that was followed by transfer to
lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment.' 0'
3. Unanswered Questions on Corporate Defendants
The Court referred to corporate liability only briefly, in a footnote. While
discussing the need for any actionable norm to be sufficiently definite, the
Court noted that a related consideration was whether liability for international
law offenses extends to private actors such as corporations. 102 Thus, to explore
the scope of corporate liability under the ATS first requires an analysis of
95. See id. (discussing the Universal Declaration).
96. See id. (discussing the I.C.C.P.R.).
97. See id. (finding that the plaintiff cannot say that the Universal Declaration and the
I.C.C.P.R. themselves establish the relevant international norm, and thus he must show the
alleged norm to have obtained customary international law status).
98. See id. at 2767-68 (discussing Alvarez's invocation of a general prohibition).
99. Id. at 2768.
100. See id. (discussing the implications of Alvarez's proposed rule).
101. See id. at 2769 (rejecting Alvarez's claim).
102. See id. at 2766 n.20 (comparing the differing views of the D.C. Circuit and the Second
Circuit on the subject of private actor liability).
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whether corporations are valid defendants in ATS suits, followed by an
examination of the violations of customary international law that will pass the
Sosa test, and finally, a determination of the appropriate standard of liability.
The Sosa decision further requires an examination of the practical
consequences of opening the federal courts to corporate ATS suits and whether
or not specific cases will justify dismissing a suit even if a plaintiff pleads an
actionable claim.
IV. Can a Corporation Be Liable Under the A TS?
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the theory of positivism began to
dominate international law. 10 3  The bedrock of the positivistic view of
international law is state sovereignty; states can only be legally bound by those
obligations to which states voluntarily consent.'°4 This fundamentally statist
view of the classical system of international law asserted the absolute equality
and independence of states "and the exclusion of nonstate actors from the
international legal plane."105 The ATS would be inapplicable to private actors
under the classical approach, which asserts that nonstate actors have neither
rights nor obligations under international law. Since World War II, however,
there has been a dramatic shift in the nature of customary international law.
0 6
The Nuremberg Trials applied the concept that individuals, not merely states,
are significant subjects of international law. 10 7 The International Court of
Justice has noted that "[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights,"'0 8 thus
recognizing the reality that individuals have rights and duties under
international law even though their status is not equal to that of states. 10 9 The
103. See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW xxxi-xxxii (2001)
(discussing the rise of positivism to replace natural law as the predominant theory of
international law).
104. See id. at xxxii (noting that positivism recognizes no international obligations other
than those to which a state has voluntarily agreed).
105. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 36, at 59-60 (asserting that the "fundamental
principles of the classical system are the absolute equality and independence of nation-states,
and the exclusion of nonstate actors from the international legal plane").
106. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 839 (discussing this shift).
107. Id.
108. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 178 (Apr. 11).
109. Stephens, supra note 8, at 445; see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that "a considerable body of
United States and international precedent indicates that corporations may be liable for violations
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idea ofjus cogens illustrates this conceptual shift in international law, asjus
cogens posits that some norms are binding on states regardless of their
consent." Moreoverjus cogens norms primarily contemplate the protection
of individual rights as opposed to states' rights. Indeed, the essence of
prohibitions on such offenses as genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture
is to limit how individuals are treated, not states, and to punish individual
wrongdoing in such cases. When considering the liability of individuals under
international law, it is important to distinguish between two distinct types of
individual liability. That individuals can be liable when they act as agents of a
state or under color of state law is well established under international law."'
Individual liability for those acting independent of any state authority or
direction is more controversial." 2 Liability for MNCs under the ATS involves
consideration of both forms of individual liability and the presence of state
action.
A. State Action Requirement and Private Actors
The initial wave of post-Filartiga suits involved victims suing individuals
acting in their official capacity," 3 and thus endorsed the widely accepted view
of individual liability-liability for those acting under color of law. Congress
applied this standard of liability when it passed the Torture Victims Protection
Act of 1991 (TVPA). The TVPA states that an "individual" who acts "under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation" shall be
liable for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing." 4 One federal district court
found that under the TVPA the term "individual" did not include
of international law, particularly when their actions constitutejus cogens violations").
110. See id. (noting that modem doctrine ofjus cogens is an example of the drift away
from the consensual basis of customary international law).
111. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,793 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring) (noting that liability for individuals acting under color of state law, arising
initially from the Nuremberg Trials, is well implanted in international law); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Pt. II introductory note (1987)
(stating that "[i]ndividuals may be held liable for offenses against international law, such as
piracy, war crimes, or genocide").
112. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 793 (discussing the meaning of individual liability).
113. See Duruigbo, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that until the mid- 1990s, the ATS remained
limited to suits against state agents abusing the power of government to oppress people).
114. Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 historical and statutory
notes § 2(a) (2000) [hereinafter TVPA]. Note that the TVPA is codified in the note section of
the ATS.
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corporations,' 1 5 but the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision to dismiss the case
on other grounds and declined to decide if corporations can be liable under the
TVPA.1 6 Two more recent district court opinions have upheld the applicability
of the TVPA to corporations.' 17 The legislative history specifies that the term
"individual" was used to foreclose suits against foreign governments or their
entities, 1 8 but does not make any mention of an exemption for private
corporations. " 9 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recently found the term
"individual" to be synonymous with "person" and that "person" has a broader
meaning in a legal context than in ordinary usage.' 20  Considering that a
corporation is a juridical person that has no particular immunity under domestic
law 2 ' and possesses the ability to sue and be sued, 122 and that a corporation is
generally viewed as a person in other areas of the law, 123 a statutory reference to
"individual" or "person" should not exclude corporations unless it is Congress's
clear intent to do so.
Given that it is reasonable to conclude that the TVPA, which addresses the
jus cogens norms of torture and extrajudicial killing, applies to corporations
acting under color of state law, it would be anomalous to find that the ATS is
limited to individual persons. Immunizing corporations would be especially
anomalous considering the purpose ofjus cogens human rights norms. These
are not norms established for the protection of states themselves, but rather for
115. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382-83 (E.D. La. 1997)
(finding that the TVPA does not extend to corporations).
116. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding
that plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient underlying facts to support claims and thus not
reaching the issue of corporate liability under the TVPA).
117. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(finding TVPA suit should not be dismissed based upon defendant's corporate status); Estate of
Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (finding that the
TVPA applies to corporations).
118. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 1, at 95-96 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-367
(1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87).
119. See Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 (noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report does not mention any exemption for corporations under the TVPA).
120. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 n.13 (1998) (finding that in the Line
Item Veto Act Congress intended "individual" to be synonymous with "person" and that
"person" includes corporations).
121. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801,803 (2002) (discussing trends in human rights liability of private
corporations).
122. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 3.02(1) (1997) (stating that a corporation has the
same power as individuals to sue and be sued).
123. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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the protection of human beings to be free from brutality in its various forms. 
124
Indeed, "[m]ost [human rights] are documented in terms of the right of persons
and not in terms of participation in or protection from the state. They are, in
the words of the International Court of Justice, obligatio erga omnes (owing by
and to all humankind)."'125 To exempt corporations who act under color of state
law would defeat the purpose of these universal norms protecting certain
human rights. Foreign states and their subdivisions and instrumentalities
generally have immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
(FSIA), 126 but it is highly unlikely for a private corporation to qualify as an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. To qualify, a corporation would
have to be majority owned by the foreign state and be "neither a citizen of a
State of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third
country.' ' 127 Moreover, the FSIA does not provide immunity to individuals
acting under color of state law.128 As discussed earlier in this Part, corporations
are legal persons with the ability to sue and be sued who have no special
immunity from legal liability. Corporations acting under color of state law
should not be granted blanket immunity from suit absent clear intent from
Congress. Under Sosa, it is quite possible that in a particular case, an ATS suit
with valid subject matter jurisdiction over a corporation will be properly
dismissed. The dismissal will not result from any broad-based immunity
granted to corporations, but rather from deference to the political branches
when a case raises significant foreign policy concerns or from other collateral
consequences. 29 Federal courts have several common law doctrines at their
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. n (1987) (stating that genocide, slavery, state-sanctioned murder, torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination are all jus cogens violations of
international human rights law). By definition, these rights aim to primarily protect humans, not
states.
125. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 215
(1989).
126. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that tort suits against foreign
states rarely fall within one of the exceptions to the FSIA and that several cases have rejected
the argument that the FSIA does not apply to violations of fundamental international law
norms).
127. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2000).
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (stating that an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is
an entity "which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise... and which is an organ of a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof'); see also STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 1, at
126 (noting that the FSIA does not provide immunity to individuals acting under color of
official authority).
129. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 (2004) (noting a possible
limitation to an ATS suit would be deference to the political branches regarding a foreign policy
concern and citing the South African apartheid litigation cases as such a situation).
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disposal to dismiss appropriate cases, including forum non coveniens, 130 the
act of state doctrine,' 3 ' and the political question doctrine. 32 These
doctrines provide federal courts the opportunity to decline or dismiss
inappropriate cases, without removing corporations altogether from
jurisdiction under the ATS-a result that would unjustly withhold
accountability from a major participant in the international arena. The Sosa
decision dealt primarily with the question of which violations of
international law are actionable under the ATS, not who can be sued under
the ATS. Notably, in Apartheid Litigation, the Southern District of New
York applied the state action requirement to corporations without
suggesting that corporations are illegitimate defendants under the ATS.1
33
Until Congress or the Supreme Court speaks more directly to the issue, the
lower courts should continue to exercise jurisdiction over corporations.
B. Private Liability in the Absence of State Action: The Kadic Standard
Certain actions by private individuals have long been actionable under
customary international law.134 In Kadic v. Karadzic,135 the Second Circuit
130. Forum non conveniens is a commron law doctrine that allows courts to dismiss a case in favor of
trial in aforeign forum JosEasupra note 25, at 87. Ifan adequate foreign forum exists, then a court weighs
the respective public and private interests to decide the most convenient forum for the litigation. Id. at 88.
131. The act ofstate docrine permits courts to reflain from exercisingjurisdiction when a case involves
claims relating to a state's official acts within its territory. Id. at40. "The purpose ofthe doctrine is to maintain
the constitutional separation ofpowers, so that the preeminence of the political branches ofgovernment over
the judiciary is maintained in the realm offoreign relations." Id. The greater the codification or consensus on
an issue of international law, the more appropriate it is for courts to exercisejurisdiction. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). Thus, if ATS claims are limited to jus cogens norms,
defendants will be unlikely to succeed on the act of state doctrine. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,250
(2d Cir. 1995) (finding that it would be rare for act ofstate doctrine to preclude an otherwise valid ATS suit).
132. The political question doctrine prevents jurisdiction over a case if the case requires adjudicating
political issues that would intrude too far into the realm of the executive and legislative branches, especiallyas
concerns matters of foreign policy JOSEP, supra note 25, at 44. However, that a case arises in a politically
charged environment does not transform the relevant issues into nonjusticiable political questions-'[t]he
doctrine is one ofpolitical questions, not one ofpolitical cases." Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (internal quotations
omitted).
133. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (engaging in a
color of law analysis as opposed to merely dismissing the case because corporations were the defendants).
134. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (finding that private liability exists for acts ofpiracy and slave trading); DAMROSCH, supra note
103, at 397 (noting that piracy and slave trading were two early examples of private responsibility for
customary international law violations).
135. SeeKadicv. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,239 (2dCir. 1995) (holdinglhat certain actions violate the law
ofnations regardless ofwhedier the actors are acting under state authoity or as private individuals). In Kadic,
the plaintiffs were citizens of Bosnia-Hezegovina who sued Karadzic, the President ofthe self-proclaimed
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incorporated this theme into the ATS by holding that private actors can
be liable for war crimes and genocide without state action, but not for
acts of torture or summary execution, unless such acts are committed in
furtherance of war crimes or genocide.' 36 Regarding genocide, the Kadic
court cited to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide which states that "persons committing genocide...
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals."'' 37 The rules of the Convention,
moreover, are consideredjus cogens, and thus permit no derogation.
1 38
Similarly the Kadic court cited to the Geneva Conventions for the
assertion that "all parties" to a conflict are obligated to adhere to the laws
of war.139 Furthermore, the international community has recognized the
liability of private parties for war crimes since World War I, which was
confirmed at the Nuremberg Trials after World War 11.140 The Ninth
Circuit has endorsed this limited extension of offenses that apply to
purely private actors,' 4' but also added forced labor to the list by arguing
that forced labor is a modem variant of slavery. 142 Several federal district
Bosnian-Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina Id. at 236-37. The plaintiffs asserted claims under the
Alien Tort Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act for acts of genocide, rape, forced prostitution,
torture, and summary execution allegedly carried out by Bosnian-Serb military forces during the Bosnian
civil war. Id. at 237. The Kadic court followed Filartiga by interpreting international law as it exists in its
curent state. Id. at 238. Citing the early examples ofpiracy and slave trading and the modem example of
aircraft hijacking, the court held that individuals can be liable for certain offenses against international law.
Id. 240. The court held that war crimes and genocide were included among these offenses not requiring
state action, but that torture and summary execution are proscribed by international law only when
committed by state officials or under color of state law. Id. at 241-44.
136. See id. (discussing which violations of international law can lead to claims against
individuals under the ATS).
137. Id. at 241 (citing to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 4, 102 Stat. 3045, 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280); see Genocide
Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (a) (2000) (criminalizing genocidal
acts regardless of whether defendant acted under color of law).
138. See ANToNIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 98 (2003) (stating that the rules
of the Genocide Conventions form a part of thejus cogens body of norms).
139. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243.
140. Id.; see CASSESE, supra note 138, at 48 (noting that war crimes can be perpetrated by
civilians and not just military personnel).
141. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the
Kadic court that crimes like rape, torture, and summary execution require state action for
liability to attach under the ATS unless they are committed in furtherance of crimes like
genocide and war crimes), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
142. See id. at 946-47 (finding that forced labor falls within slavery for purposes of private
liability). It is important to note that in Unocal, the Ninth Circuit relied exclusively upon U.S.
law to determine that forced labor qualifies as a private liability offense. For a critique of the
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courts, outside of the Second and Ninth Circuits' jurisdictions, have
accepted the Kadic rationale as well. 43 Given the broad consensus that
thejus cogens norms of piracy, slavery, war crimes, and genocide apply
to purely private conduct, the Sosa decision should not be interpreted to
foreclose such liability. Furthermore, all of these norms fall within the
Sosa standard for being universal and definite, as discussed below in Part
V. Otherjus cogens norms, however, still require state action and under
Sosa's cautious standard, should not be extended into the purely private
category of actionable norms. Torture, extrajudicial killing, and crimes
against humanity would be the most obvious examples of jus cogens
norms still requiring state action. In the TVPA, Congress explicitly
limited claims for torture and extrajudicial killing to acts committed
"under actual or apparent authority, or color of state law, of any foreign
nation." 144 This reflects the international consensus on torture as well. 1
45
As to crimes against humanity, there does not appear to be a broad
acceptance of liability for purely private acts. 4 6 Without state action,
plaintiffs seeking to hold MNCs liable under the ATS need to assert a
claim under one of the small number of offenses where private liability
attaches.
The corporate ATS suits almost exclusively involve situations where
plaintiffs have accused MNCs of committing or contributing to human rights
court's decision to classify forced labor as slavery, see Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Note &
Comment, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational Corporations: The Ninth
Circuit Strikes Again in JudicialActivism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1009, 1038-48 (2003).
143. See Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1261 (N.D. Ala.
2003) (finding that since plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violations of law of war, the court did not
need to address the issue of whether defendants acted under color of state law); Ge v. Peng, 201
F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 n.5 (D.D.C. 2000) (accepting the Second Circuit's conclusion that the ATS
extends to private parties for acts of genocide and war crimes).
144. TVPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 historical and statutory notes § 2(a) (2000).
145. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, 108 Stat. 463,463, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 115 (defining torture
as "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity").
146. See CASSESE, supra note 138, at 83 (noting that the case law indicates that crimes
against humanity can be perpetrated "by individuals acting in their private capacity, provided
they act in unison.., with a general state policy"); CLAIRE DE THAN & EDWIN SHORTS,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 95 (2003) (finding that "[i]t is not
unforeseeable that some private organised groups may have their own criminal agenda, in the
absence of some government policy" and commit crimes against humanity). AI-Qaeda would be
a prime example of such an organization.
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violations in connection with official state activity. Cases alleging corporate
liability without state involvement are rare because their success would depend
on alleging an offense which entails private liability. Claims of genocide and
war crimes, for example, require broad, systematic activity that is typically
carried on by official actors. Scenarios where a corporation would be involved
in these violations without state activity are difficult, although not impossible,
to imagine.
47
V. Actionable Norms Post-Sosa
A. Looking to Piracy for Historical Guidance (or Lack Thereoj)
Attempting to derive actionable norms of customary international law
based upon eighteenth century international law may prove to be a difficult
task. The Court's requirement that a modem-day norm be accepted by the
international community of states and defined with a specificity comparable to
the eighteenth century Blackstone offenses offers little practical guidance on
how to perform such an analysis. 48 The Court itself did not analyze the degree
of acceptance or specificity of the Blackstone offenses. When stating its
transhistorical standard, the Court merely cited to an early nineteenth century
Supreme Court case that illustrated the specificity with which the law of nations
defined piracy. 149 But engaging in a comparison of norms separated by more
than two centuries and emanating from markedly different substantive law will
likely be an arduous endeavor, one in which the lower courts may not care to
fully partake. 150
Regardless, the Supreme Court did emphasize the importance of looking
to the eighteenth century for guidance. Of the three Blackstone offenses, piracy
is most closely analogous to the modem human rights claims under the ATS.' 5'
147. See Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285,1301 (S.D. Fla.
2003) (noting that in most ATS cases against corporations, the corporation is sued for
complicity in what are "clearly actions taken by state entities").
148. See Leading Case, Alien Tort Statute, 118 HARv. L. REv. 446,454 (2004) (noting that
both of the Sosa Court's historical standards are vague, and that the Court offers few practical
clues to guide a lower court's inquiry).
149. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,2765 (2004) (citing to United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163-80 (1820)).
150. See Leading Case, supra note 148, at 454-55 (remarking that it is hard to imagine
how to compare the specificity of one rule to another rule from a completely different
substantive area, as it existed two centuries ago; noting that lower courts are unlikely to perform
such a rule-to-rule comparison in the abstract).
151. See Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 132 (finding that, of the Blackstone offenses,
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As Justice Breyer pointed out in his concurrence in Sosa, international comity
concerns, -2 do not arise when the conduct in question occurs in the forum state,
such as when an American assaults a foreign diplomat who in turn sues in a
United States court.153  On the contrary, like piracy, alleged human rights
violations by MNCs usually arise outside of the most traditional basis of
jurisdiction: territoriality. 154 Most alleged human rights offenses by MNCs
occur on foreign soil with little connection to the United States other than that
the MNC is perhaps incorporated or headquartered in the United States.
According to Blackstone, violations involving ambassadors or safe conducts
were punished only by the state "where the offense occurred, whereas every
community hath a right.., to inflict.., punishment upon pirates," thus
granting universal jurisdiction to combat piracy.15 The Sosa Court specifically
cited to piracy and not the other offenses to illustrate the specificity of the
Blackstone offenses. 56 Justice Breyer's concurrence supported the majority's
apparent focus on piracy when he read the Court to require an actionable
international norm to be as definite in its content as the eighteenth century norm
of piracy.157  Furthermore, after the Court stated its historical test, it
approvingly cited to Filartiga's characterization of the pirate as "hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind."'
58
As to the specificity of the eighteenth century international norm against
piracy, the Supreme Court in 1820 found that: "There is scarcely a writer on
the law of nations, who does not allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and
determinate nature; and whatever may be the diversity of definitions.., all
piracy is the closest analogue to modem human rights offenses).
152. The doctrine of international comity encourages forbearance when a sovereign state
that has a legitimate jurisdictional claim recognizes that another sovereign state also has a
legitimate jurisdictional claim under international law. See DAMROSCH, supra note 102, at 1104
(noting that comity is more an aspiration than a fixed rule, and more a matter of grace than
obligation).
153. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring).
154. See RESTATEMFNT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
cmt. b (1987) (stating that territoriality is considered the normal basis ofjurisdiction, whereas
nationality is more of an exception, but that both are subject to the limits of § 403).
155. Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 135 & n.103 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 71).
156. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765 (2004) (discussing the standards
for finding a cause of action that falls within § 1350).
157. Id. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring).
158. See id. at 2765-66 (finding that the Court's historical limit upon actionable norms is
"generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue
before it reached this Court") (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980)).
1244
ALIEN TORT STATUTE AFTER SOSA v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 1245
writers concur ... that robbery, or forcible depredations upon the sea, amino
furandi, is piracy."'15 9 It is important to note here that the Court acknowledged
some "diversity of definitions."16 0 The Court found the requisite specificity by
looking to a core definition, even if some writers differed to varying degrees on
the scope of piracy. The Court also found that writers on the common law, the
civil law, and the maritime (admiralty) law all universally treated piracy "as an
offence [sic] against the law of nations", and that its definition under such law
is "robbery upon the sea."'6'1 Blackstone likewise defined piracy as robbery on
the high seas without state permission.162 There do not appear to have been any
states who dissented from this core definition. 63 The universal acceptance of
the eighteenth century piracy offense must be tempered with the reality that the
scope of"all nations" 164 in the eighteenth century is dramatically different from
what would be required for modem day universal acceptance. When, for
example, the Supreme Court declared that piracy was universally accepted by
all nations, the Court only cited to sources from the European or Western
traditions 1r-not a surprising reliance considering the year was 1820. Today,
universal acceptance requires a much greater swath of the international
community. This further exemplifies the difficulties that arise when comparing
international norms from vastly different historical periods.
B. Jus Cogens as an Organizing Principle for A TS Norms
Given the Sosa Court's demand for a high degree of acceptance and
specificity, thejus cogens offenses within customary international law should
159. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820). Amino furandi
essentially refers to the element of piracy requiring that it be committed without the sanction of
any state. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210,232 (1844). United States v. Smith
is the case the Sosa Court cited to illustrate the specificity of eighteenth century piracy within
the law of nations. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765.
160. Smith, 18 U.S. at 161.
161. Id. at 161-62; see Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 139 ("The universal condemnation
of piracy was not just embodied in the law of nations norm against it-piracy was also a serious
crime under the municipal laws of every nation.").
162. See 4 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 71-72 (declaring piracy to be "robbery
and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed upon land, would have amounted to a
felony there").
163. See Kontorovich, supra note 43, at 140 (noting that "all nations concurred as to the
definition" of piracy).
164. See id. (same).
165. See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 163 n.8 (citing to various English, Roman, French,
and Spanish sources on piracy).
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determine the minimum threshold for actionable norms under the ATS. While
the Court did not specifically address the concept ofjus cogens offenses, it
referred to the limits of Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States Section 702 as "only the beginning of the enquiry.
"166
Restatement Section 702 lists six peremptory (jus cogens) norms of the
customary international law of human rights: genocide, slavery (or slave trade),
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture, prolonged arbitrary
detention, and systematic racial discrimination. 167 The Court found that even if
"some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad that those who
enforce them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to say which
policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone's three
common law offenses.' 68 Here, the Court implied that even somejus cogens
offenses may not be sufficient to meet the historical test. Additionally, the
Court has announced a standard that is based not upon the level of
egregiousness of the conduct, but rather upon how certain and well accepted
the underlying offenses are. This is a critical distinction to be made in the
context of alleged human rights offenses. Human rights activists, for many
well-intentioned reasons, want to expand the number of actionable norms, but
their arguments tend to be normative in substance and infused with moralistic
language. 169 Even the Second Circuit, which opened the doors to human rights
suits under the ATS, has refused to look to any morally based standard. The
Second Circuit rejected a plaintiffs proposal that a "shockingly egregious"
standard be used to determine torts that violate customary international law.17
0
The adoption of a "shockingly egregious" standard would replace the consent
of nations as the source of customary international law with the subjective
standards of individual courts and judges.' 7 '
Despite the Court's admonition to conduct a stringent transhistorical
analysis, the lower courts may choose not to engage in such a rule-to-rule
166. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004).
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
cmt. n (1987) (noting that "[n]ot all human rights norms are peremptory norms (jus cogens), but
those in clauses (a) to (f)... are").
168. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769.
169. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 468 (finding that academic experts are typically
expressing their own normative beliefs regarding the content of international law).
170. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 159 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding the
plaintiffs' standard entirely inconsistent with the court's understanding of customary
international law).
171. See id. at 159-60 (finding that the "egregiousness standard would divert[] attention
from universally accepted standards to concepts.., that are easily subject to differing
interpretations by the courts of different nations") (internal quotations omitted).
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comparison. As mentioned above in Part III, the Sosa Court did not provide
any practical guidance on how to conduct such a comparison, nor did it conduct
such an analysis itself. The vagaries of the Court's test may well lead to
unpredictable and conflicting results in the lower courts, an outcome predicted
by Justice Scalia in his concurrence. Scalia wrote, "[T]he Court ignores its own
conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction, wags a finger at the lower
courts for going too far, and then-repeating the same formula the ambitious
lower courts themselves have used-invites them to try again.0 72 Predicting
the outcome of this invitation, Scalia warned that the lower federal courts will
be the primary source of recognizing actionable ATS norms, as the Court
reviews few of their decisions, of which "no one thinks that all of them are
eminently reasonable.' 73 The majority asserted that the "door [to recognizing
new actionable norms] is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus
open to a narrow class of international norms today.' 74 The uncertainty of the
Court's guidance, however, may undermine this "vigilant doorkeeping."
Considering that the facts surrounding the Sosa case were fairly modest in
comparison to more serious human rights offenses, the Sosa decision is not
very helpful in deciphering which international norms are actionable.
Moreover, the Court does not identify a single norm that would qualify, yet the
Court does refer to a "narrow class of international norms" that are
actionable. 175 The Court essentially punted the issue to the lower courts. To
fill the gap left by the Sosa decision, the lower courts should only permit claims
based upon jus cogens norms. The jus cogens principle provides the lower
federal courts with the most logical organizing principle to meet the Sosa
standard. The stringent requirements forjus cogens status naturally limit this
select set of norms to the most universally recognized principles in international
law.
No official international agreement codifies a list ofjus cogens norms, but
there is a general consensus which includes genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, piracy, torture, slavery, prolonged arbitrary detention, and
extrajudicial murder. 76 Perhaps the most frustrating part of the Sosa opinion is
172. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2776 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia argued that the majority essentially endorsed the Ninth Circuit's standard that any
norm be universal, specific, and obligatory, even though that standard led to a result the
majority reversed. Id. at 2774-75.
173. See id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding the recognition of new ATS norms an
"illegitimate lawmaking endeavor").
174. Id. at 2764.
175. Id.
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt.
n (1987) (stating that genocide, slavery (or slave trade), murder or causing the disappearance of
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its lack of clarity on how to evaluate these universal, obligatory, and specific
violations under the ATS. Definitiveness, not egregiousness, must be the
guiding standard. 17 7 , But how are lower courts to distinguish one from the
other? In Apartheid Litigation, the Southern District for New York lamented
the Supreme Court's lack of clarity, declaring that "it would have been
unquestionably preferable for the lower federal courts if the Supreme Court had
created a bright-line rule."'i7 8  Lower courts are unlikely to undertake the
transhistorical analysis, and inconsistent outcomes will result from those courts
that do attempt such an inquiry. More likely, the lower courts will draw a line
near thejus cogens offenses, especially those that have been, for the most part,
universally accepted as actionable norms under the lower courts' ATS
jurisprudence. A jus cogens norm may not necessarily meet the specificity
standard established by the Sosa decision.' 79 However, given the Court's heavy
emphasis on caution and broad international acceptance, lower courts will feel
more comfortable allowing suits to move forward on those offenses deemed so
serious that the community of states allows no derogation.
The offenses of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery,
extrajudicial killing, and torture have been universally upheld as actionable by
individuals, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination are
peremptory (jus cogens) norms); DE THAN & SHORTS, supra note 146, at 10 (listing genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery, torture, and aggression as generally agreed
uponjus cogens crimes); see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 2d. 289, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that allegations of genocide, war crimes, torture,
and enslavement are universally condemned jus cogens violations of international law); M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 498 (1992)
(discussing crimes against humanity as ajus cogens norm).
177. See Sosa, 124S. Ct. at 2769 (finding that the enemy of the human race rationale is not
sufficient in the context of prolonged arbitrary detention).
178. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
179. Even those offenses which are traditionally considered universally accepted and
binding, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture, have uncertain definitions to
varying degrees. Currently, no international convention exists that outlines the scope of crimes
against humanity; the absence of such a convention has left states to define the scope of the
crime. See DE THAN & SHORTS, supra note 146, at 89 (noting that the lack of a treaty has left
states "to their own devices when considering under what circumstances perpetrators of this
crime should be prosecuted"). The Rome Conference, which established the International
Criminal Court, ran into this problem when attempting to construct a definition for crimes
against humanity since no written formulation of the crime existed in any treaty. Id. at 114. As
to war crimes, "[n]o authoritative and legally binding list of war crimes exists in customary
law... [A]n enumeration can only be found in the Statute of the [International Criminal Court],
under Article 8, which is not, however, intended to codify customary law." CASSESE,supra note
138, at 54. Torture, despite itsjus cogens status, does not have a universal definition. See DE
THAN & SHORTS, supra note 146, at 189 (noting that there is no universal definition for torture
and that many treaties do not provide a definition of torture but merely state that torture is
prohibited).
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the lower federal courts that recognize the modem norms. 180 In the absence of
further direction from Congress or the Supreme Court, the lower courts should
continue to uphold this narrow class of offenses, all with jus cogens status.
This Note does not attempt to define and specify every norm that may or not
qualify asjus cogens. Given the fluctuating nature of international law, the list
may change over time, a result dictated by the Sosa opinion which called for
gauging claims against the current state of international law.' 81 Moreover,
because the class ofjus cogens norms is not definitively established, courts can
reasonably differ over borderline jus cogens offenses. This may appear to
inject confusion similar to that of the Sosa decision, but a standard limited to
jus cogens drastically reduces the uncertainty of the Sosa test. Any reasonable
test will involve debates on the fringes, but the jus cogens test narrows the
debate to the most universal norms.
C. Misapplying Sosa: Lessons from In re South African
Apartheid Litigation
As mentioned above in Part III, the Southern District of New York, in In
re South African Apartheid Litigation,'82 did not engage in any historical
comparison between the eighteenth century offenses and the alleged violations,
which included genocide, torture, extrajudicial killings, and war crimes. 183 The
district court even acknowledged that "the Sosa decision did not deliver the
180. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844,848 (1 th Cir. 1996) (affirming ajudgment
against defendants for torture under the ATS); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,241-45 (2d Cir.
1995) (finding genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary execution to be actionable ATS
offenses); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding torture as
actionable under ATS); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding
official torture under the ATS); Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d
1285, 1299-1300 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (recognizing crimes against humanity as actionable under
ATS); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1261-62 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(finding extrajudicial killings and war crimes actionable under ATS); Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding genocide,
war crimes, enslavement, and extrajudicial killings fall within scope of ATS); Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (upholding ATS suit under claims of
torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).
181. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004).
182. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that none of plaintiffs' claims against numerous MNCs for international law violations
connected with the apartheid government support jurisdiction under the ATS).
183. See id. at 546 (noting that the Sosa decision required ATS claims to be "well-accepted
and clearly-defined offenses under international law such as piracy and offenses involving
ambassadors," yet not conducting any study of the nature of the eighteenth century offenses).
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definitive guidance in this area that some had come to expect."''84 In dismissing
the plaintiffs' claims for international law violations by MNCs who -did
business in apartheid South Africa, the court erroneously interpreted the Sosa
decision and the nature of international law. The court found that there can be
no liability based upon violations of genocide norms, as embodied in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
185
While acknowledging that treaties are valid sources of international norms, the
court found that the Genocide Convention suffered from defects that preclude
its use as evidence of applicable customary law. 186 The defects were that the
treaty is criminal in nature and is not self-executing.
87
The court misinterpreted Sosa by focusing on whether the treaty is
criminal as opposed to civil in nature. In Sosa, Sosa argued that because
Blackstone's offenses were described in terms of criminal liabilities that they
were inapplicable to the ATS which required a "tort.0 88 The Sosa Court
rejected this argument, finding, for example, that the criminal sanctions for
offenses against ambassadors were closely linked with comparable civil
reparations. 89 Furthermore, the Court interpreted the ATS to "provide a cause
of action for the modest number of international law violations with apotential
for personal liability at the time."' 90 The Sosa Court did not limit ATS norms
to those expressly defined in civil liability terms, but rather to those with a
potential for such. The Apartheid Litigation court misapplied international law
by suggesting that because the Genocide Convention was not self-executing,
the norm against genocide was inapplicable to the ATS. Genocide is clearly a
jus cogens norm' 91 and as such is a part of customary international law.
Moreover, the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention themselves
have reached the status ofJus cogens and customary international law.' 92 Thus,
the fact that the Genocide Convention is not self-executing is irrelevant. If the
norms embodied in the treaty did not have customary international law orjus
184. Id. at 547.
185. See id. at 552 (finding that "no liability based upon any alleged violation of these
norms [torture and genocide] can form an adequate predicate for jurisdiction under the ATCA").
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2760 (2004).
189. See id. at 2761 (noting that the criminal sanction for offenses against ambassadors was
explicitly linked "with the requirement that the state, at the expense of the delinquent, give full
satisfaction to the sovereign who has been offended") (internal quotations omitted).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. n (1987) (including genocide in thejus cogens category).
192. See CASSESE, supra note 138, at 98 (discussing genocide).
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cogens status, then the treaty's lack of self-execution would prevent it from
providing actionable ATS norms. 193 That a treaty norm is not self-executing
does not nullify its force under the ATS.194 Justice Scalia strongly opposed this
rationale in his concurrence to Sosa,195 but the Apartheid Litigation court
should not have placed great weight on Scalia's criticism. Although Scalia
concurred in the judgment, he was strongly at odds with the majority's
reasoning.196  The Apartheid Litigation decision can better be viewed as
decided on the foreign policy considerations that the Sosa court addressed.
Indeed, the Sosa Court specifically mentioned the South African apartheid-
related cases as a prime example of when the judicial branch should show great
deference to the political branches. 197 Even if the Apartheid Litigation court
had found an actionable norm under the ATS, it likely would have dismissed
the case because of the foreign policy considerations involved. But the lessons
from the Apartheid Litigation decision are that the criminal context of a norm
does not prevent it from meeting the Sosa test and that a treaty cannot
invalidate ajus cogens norm for ATS purposes.
D. Environmental, Political, and Economic Norms Inactionable
Under Sosa
Even ifjus cogens is not established as a bright line test for ATS norms,
there are several actions particularly relevant to MNCs that will fail to meet the
Sosa standard. The two main areas that Sosa would appear to foreclose, at least
as international law currently exists, are environmental abuses and social,
193. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 515,516 (199 1) (stating
that non-self-executing treaties "require implementing action by the political branches of
government or... are otherwise unsuitable for judicial application").
194. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,242 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that even though the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act did not provide a private right of action, it would be
improper to construe this as repealing the ATS by implication). "[R]epeals by implication are
not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest." Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (internal quotations omitted). "[M]utual exclusivity
[is] necessary to impute to Congress the clear, affirmative intent to repeal." United States v.
Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted).
195. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2775 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing the Kadic court's reasoning that the decision not to create a new private cause of
action cannot be construed as repealing by implication the cause of action supplied by the ATS).
196. See id. at 2772-73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority has turned federal
common law jurisprudence on its head).
197. See id. at 2766 n.21 (noting that the United States State Department and the South
African government had both objected to the apartheid cases).
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political, and economic rights violations. The pre-Sosa jurisprudence
universally rejected environmentally based ATS claims. 198 Coupled with the
Court's cautiously high standard, this rejection will likely stand.
Environmental abuses may be actionable, however, under the theory that they
were committed in furtherance of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity. Additionally, it is possible that international environmental norms
will ripen into universal, binding, and clearly defined obligations. Several ATS
suits have been brought alleging a violation of a right to organize unions. 199
Plaintiffs in these cases have argued that the Universal Declaration and the
I.C.C.P.R. provide a basis for such claims. 200  The Sosa Court directly
addressed the status of these two international agreements. As to the Universal
Declaration, the Court found it to be aspirational and not to impose any
obligations as a matter of international law. 20' The I.C.C.P.R. does bind the
United States as a matter of international law, but as a non-self-executing
treaty, it does not create actions enforceable in the federal courts,20 2 and thus
the social, economic, and political rights enumerated in the treaty require
independent sources validating them as customary international law. These
rights have yet to reach that status.
VI. Standards of Liability
Assuming that MNCs can be liable under the ATS, as discussed above in
Part V, either as purely private actors or as actors under the color of law, the
basic principles of agency law and respondeat superior will guide the standard
of liability. Because the corporation is a legal fiction, it only acts through its
198. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that
numerous international treaties do not provide any evidence that intranational environmental
pollution violates customary international law); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d
161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that cited treaties do not provide articulable standards to
identify international environmental torts); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1160
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that violations of plaintiffs' right to life, health, and security of the
person via environmental harm do not involve specific, universal, and obligatory international
norms).
199. See, e.g., Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1296 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (alleging deprivation of "fundamental rights to associate and organize"); Estate of
Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1264 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (finding that
fundamental rights to associate and organize may be actionable norms under the ATS).
200. See Aldana, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 (citing to these sources); Estate of Rodriguez,
256 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (same).
201. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004) (finding the Universal
Declaration to be more a statement of principles than a source of legal obligations).
202. Id.
1252
ALIEN TORT STATUTE AFTER SOSA v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 1253
agents who have either actual or apparent authority.20 3 Under respondeat
superior, when an employer (principal) employs an employee (agent) to
perform services and controls or has the right to control how the agent performs
the services, then the principal is liable for the torts of the agent assuming the
agent is acting within the scope of his employment. 204 This is true even in
cases of intentional torts. 20 5 Thus, an MNC will be liable for acts committed by
its employee-agents that violate actionable ATS norms when the MNC acts
under color of state law or when it violates norms that do not require state
action (piracy, slavery, genocide, and war crimes). But under agency law, an
employer generally is not liable for the torts of independent contractor agents,
who are defined as those whom the employer generally cannot control as to the
manner in which the work is to be done.206 There are, however, exceptions to
this general rule including that employers may be liable for negligently
selecting a contractor, giving improper instructions or equipment, or in failing
to stop any unnecessarily dangerous practices that come to their attention.20 7
These exceptions are particularly relevant to MNCs doing business in third
world countries. If, for example, an MNC hires a firm to provide security for a
large scale project, and that firm has been regularly known to use torture and
extrajudicial killings, then the MNC should be held liable for hiring such an
agent.
One district court wrote: "[I]t would be a strange tort system that imposed
liability on state actors but not on those who conspired with them to perpetrate
illegal acts through the coercive use of state power. 20 8  In addition to
corporations being liable for the tortious acts of their agents under the ATS, a
more controversial question arises: What sort of third party liability can an
MNC have under the ATS? Can an MNC that is found not to be acting under
color of law or involved in private party offenses be liable for acts committed
by a state actor or another private actor under some type of joint liability or
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958) (defining authority as "the power
of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the
principal's manifestations of consent to him"); id. at § 8 (defining apparent authority as "the
power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons,
professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's
manifestations to such third persons").
204. Id. at § 219(1).
205. See PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 663 n.4 (Victor E. Schwartz et al. eds.,
2000) (noting that "an employer may be held liable for the intentional torts of his employee
when they are reasonably connected with the employment and so within its scope").
206. Id. at 666 n. 1.
207. Id. at 668 n.2.
208. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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aiding and abetting theory? The pre-Sosa case law regarding the applicability
of third party liability standards for MNCs under the ATS is rather limited.
A. Determining Who Is a State Actor: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Before looking at third party liability standards, it is important to
understand how the courts determine who is a state actor and how this relates to
liability. In Kadic, the Second Circuit used the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "under color
of law" jurisprudence to determine if a defendant engaged in state action for
purposes of ATS jurisdiction. 20 9 The Supreme Court has established four
different tests for the state action requirement: (1) the public function test;
210
(2) the symbiotic relationship test; 21' (3) the nexus test;212 and (4) the joint
action test.213 The joint action and nexus tests are similar in scope, with
perhaps the main difference being that a nexus implies a continuing
relationship, whereas joint action can relate to a single event.214 In the Kadic
209. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,245 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the "color of law
jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in
official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the [ATS]"). The "under color of law"
jurisprudence originates from suits attempting to hold private actors liable for civil rights
violations, which are normally only enforceable against state actors. See JOSEPH, supra note 25,
at 33 (discussing the requirements of state action).
210. The public function test applies when a private actor performs a function that is
"traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State." Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 353 (1974). This test is quite narrow and rarely satisfied, as the function must be one
normally reserved exclusively to the state. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN,
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 75 (2d ed. 2004). The test generally has been limited to such
activities as conducting an election, running a town, providing fire protection, or operating a
municipal park. Id. at 75-76.
211. A symbiotic relationship exists when the state "has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with [the private party] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,725
(1961).
212. The nexus test "requires evidence that the state has coerced or significantly
encouraged the private party to engage in [the relevant] conduct." LEWIS & NORMAN, supra
note 210, at 78. State funding, approval or acquiescence, or regulation, without more, will not
satisfy the test. Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Note, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability
of Transnational Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 359, 390 (1999).
213. The Kadic court appeared to apply the joint action test, defining it to be whether "[a
private individual] acts together with state officials or with significant state aid." Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995). The test has also been described as whether "there
is a 'substantial degree of cooperative action' between the state and private officials." Gallagher
v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations
omitted).
214. See JOSEPH, supra note 25, at 34 (stating that the "nexus test arises where there is such
1254
ALIEN TORT STATUTE AFTER SOSA v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 1255
case, the Second Circuit applied a variant of the joint action test, probably the
test most widely used in ATS cases, stating that "[a] private individual acts
under color of law within the meaning of [S]ection 1983 when he acts together
with state officials or with significant state aid. 2 15 Other elements of the joint
action test attach state action when there is a substantial degree of
cooperation 216 or a conspiracy, 7 between state and private actors. The public
function test will rarely be successful against MNCs given its narrow scope.218
Perhaps if an MNC controlled an area that had all the attributes of a local town,
this test would be applicable in an ATS case. An important aspect of § 1983
jurisprudence for ATS purposes is that defendants who abuse the power or
position they receive from the state are still acting under color of law.219
The application of the "color of law" standard of § 1983 has its critics.
Part of this stems from the reality that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
§ 1983 has "not been a model of consistency., 220 Further, some critics argue
that the proper role for § 1983 in the ATS analysis is to determine who is a
221state actor, but not to determine the liability standard for a private actor.
Under this view, the § 1983 analysis improperly narrows the ATS's scope and
allows private actors who violate customary international law to escape liability
a connection between the private actor and the State that it is fair to treat the action of one as
that of the other" and that "[j]oint action liability arises when private actors and governments are
willful participants in a partnership, so that both are liable for abuses perpetrated by one party in
performance of partnership tasks").
215. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (ruling that "plaintiffs are entitled to prove their allegations
that [defendant] Karadzic acted under color of law of Yugoslavia by acting in concert with
Yugoslav officials or with significant Yugoslavian aid").
216. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,328
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that a substantial degree of cooperation existed when Talisman
allegedly paid Sudan for protection knowing that it would lead to unlawful attacks on civilians,
permitted the Sudanese military to use its facilities to launch some of the unlawful attacks, and
helped plan a strategy that involved "ethnic cleansing").
217. See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1304 (S.D. Fla.
2003) (stating that a conspiracy or a willful participation between a private and state actor
normally will satisfy the joint action test).
218. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. La. 1997)
(finding that defendant corporation's control over large area of land (26,400 square kilometers)
that was policed by corporate security with draconian measures did not establish state action
under public function test).
219. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988).
220. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,378 (1995) (internal quotations
omitted).
221. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing
Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 183, 199 (2002) (arguing that the ATS should
impose liability on a private party who aided and abetted a state actor, and that § 1983 should be
used merely to determine who is the state actor).
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219 (2005)
solely because they cannot be deemed de facto state actors.222 One of the
concerns with using § 1983 jurisprudence in ATS cases is that the § 1983
"under color of law" tests mainly apply to actions by private entities and not the
223state. But the ATS cases against MNCs usually allege actions by state
entities for which plaintiffs seek to hold MNCs liable.224 "Applying § 1983 in
these cases, therefore, requires an inversion of the usual relationships found in
color of state law cases." 225 This inversion, however, does not negate the
§ 1983 tests. The Supreme Court has held private parties liable for the actions
of state actors.226 Despite this apparent flexibility of § 1983, the Kadic court
incorporated § 1983 jurisprudence as a "relevant guide to whether a defendant
has engaged in official action., 227 Limiting MNC liability under the ATS to
situations where plaintiffs satisfy one of the § 1983 tests is overly restrictive.
Unless a plaintiff alleges slavery, piracy, genocide, or war crimes, customary
international law requires the presence of state action.228 But the proper role of
§ 1983 should be to determine who the state actor is and not to decide all
questions of liability. 229 If an MNC violates an actionable norm and also can be
deemed a state actor under § 1983, then § 1983 will decide the liability
question. When a state actor who is not an MNC commits the relevant offense,
the question should not only be whether the MNC has acted under color of law,
but also whether the conduct of the state actor can be imputed to the MNC for
tort liability purposes. This question can be answered by well-established tort
and agency law principles; after all, it is the Alien Tort Statute.
222. See id. at 200 (asserting that if the aiding and abetting standard is not employed in the
ATS analysis, then companies will be free to do business with "rogue governments" and provide
support for activities violating human rights while avoiding liability).
223. See Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1359, 1378 (2002) (finding that the § 1983 doctrines
appear "to deal with action by the private entity, and not the state").
224. See id. (noting that the law seems to contemplate actions committed by private actors
who bear some imprimatur of state action, whereas ATS suits against MNCs involve actions
committed by a state actor who bears some imprimatur of the private actor).
225. Id.
226. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980) (holding that private parties who
conspired with ajudge who illegally issued injunctions were acting under color of state law and
are thus liable for damages).
227. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
228. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the jurisprudence that some customary international
law violations do not require state action under the ATS).
229. See Collingsworth, supra note 221, at 199 (arguing that the role of § 1983 is to
identify who is a state actor, not to resolve the issue of liability).
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The Sosa decision did not address any of these issues because Sosa, as a
DEA operative, was a state actor and committed the alleged ATS violation.230
The Sosa Court decided how causes of action under the ATS were to be
recognized, not the issues of state action or standards of tort liability. Concerns
of the federal judiciary overstepping its authority by creating new causes of
action should not arise if the lower courts look past § 1983 to federal tort law.
By applying federal tort law, the lower courts will be fulfilling their duty to
resolve ancillary issues of congressional legislation. 231 Looking to federal tort
law has the potential to expand liability under the ATS, and thus could
implicate the Court's concerns regarding foreign affairs.232 But the Sosa Court
clearly recognized that there were some violations that are actionable under the
ATS,233 and therefore it is reasonable to address that limited class of
international norms with the appropriate liability standards. Finding the
appropriate liability standard will be particularly important if cases arise where
no state actor exists and the relevant violation does not require a state actor
(genocide, war crimes, piracy, and slavery). Agency law alone may not be
sufficient in such scenarios and "under color of law" jurisprudence will be
irrelevant since state action is not required. Imagine a scenario in which two
freight corporations entered into a joint venture, and one corporation allowed
its shipping instrumentalities to transport sex slaves with the other corporation's
knowledge or assistance. Should the second corporation be free from liability,
assuming the transport of slaves is actionable under the norm against slavery?
B. Aiding and Abetting as an International Standard ofLiability
Several recent ATS cases have addressed what liability standards should
connect a private corporation to state actors' international law violations. None
of these was more closely watched than the Ninth Circuit case of Doe I v.
230. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004) (noting that Sosa, who
was hired by the DEA to seize Alvarez, held Alvarez overnight in a hotel).
231. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,727 (1979) (noting that when
Congress has not spoken to an issue substantially related to established government programs,
the federal courts are authorized to fill the interstices of federal legislation by their own
standards).
232. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763 (discussing foreign policy implications of § 1350 (citing
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(arguing that § 1350 should not be read to require "our courts [to] sit in judgment of the conduct
of foreign officials in their own countries with respect to their own citizens"))).
233. See id. at 2764 (noting that "the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and
thus open to a narrow class of international norms today") (emphasis added).
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Unocal Corp.3 Of the several dozens of ATS cases filed against corporations,
none has gone to trial on the merits, but the Unocal case moved further along in
the federal courts than any other.235 Like Filartiga, the Unocal case was a
watershed event for ATS suits, as it "opened the floodgates" to human rights
claims against MNCs, primarily because the case enunciated the principle that
federal courts can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over human rights abuses
236involving MNCs that enter into joint ventures with foreign governments.
Even though the case has recently been settled while awaiting an en banc
rehearing,237 the Ninth Circuit's advocacy in Unocal for the aiding and abetting
standard provides a detailed discussion of the scope of the appropriate standard
of liability.
238
The plaintiffs in Doe Iv. Unocal Corp.239 were villagers in the Tenasserim
region of Myanmar (formerly Burma) who alleged that Unocal Corporation
directly or indirectly subjected them to forced labor, murder, rape, and torture
when the company constructed a local natural gas pipeline.240 In 1988, the
Myanmar military took over the country and established Myanmar Oil, a state-
241owned oil and gas company. Myanmar Oil later licensed a gas pipeline
construction project to Total S.A., a French oil company, of which Unocal
acquired a twenty-eight percent interest. 242 Unocal allegedly knew that the
Myanmar military provided security and other services for the pipeline
243project. Sufficient evidence also existed to raise a genuine issue of material
234. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Unocal
may be held liable for aiding and abetting under the ATS for subjecting plaintiffs to forced
labor), reh "g ranted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). For a full discussion of Unocal, see below
in this subpart. See also Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2004, at A l (noting that the Unocal litigation "was seen as a key test for human rights activists
who want to hold multinationals responsible ... for atrocities committed in other countries").
235. Girion, supra note 234, at Al. There has not yet been a judgment against a
corporation in an ATS suit. Daphne Eviatar, Judgment Day: Will an Obscure Law Bring Down
the Global Economy?, BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2003, at D1.
236. Duruigbo, supra note 7, at 7.
237. Susan Beck, Multinational Exposure: An Obscure 1789 Law Continues to Offer
Plaintiffs Counsel International Litigation Leverage, AM. LAW., Feb. 2005, at 26, 26.
238. See Rivera, supra note 13, at 274 (stating that the Ninth Circuit's decision "probably
has the best discussion of third-party liability in a corporate ATCA case thus far").
239. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) is a consolidated appeal of
several actions filed by Myanmar villages against Unocal Corporation. Id. at 944.
240. Id. at 936.
241. Id.at936-37.
242. See id. at 937 (noting that Myanmar licensed the pipeline and gas extraction project to
a French company from which Unocal acquired its interest in the project).
243. Id.at937-38.
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fact as to whether the pipeline project actually hired the Myanmar military to
provide and even direct to some degree these services and whether Unocal
knew about this.244 The villagers alleged that the Myanmar military forced
them, under threat of violence, to work on the pipeline project, and that in
furtherance of this forced labor program, the military subjected them to murder,
rape, and torture.245 The villagers based their claims against Unocal on the
ATS for violations of the law of nations.246
The Unocal court found that forced labor is a modem variant of slavery,
which places it within the handful of crimes that do not require state action.247
By classifying forced labor as such, the Ninth Circuit reasoned from Kadic that
the villagers' claims of murder, torture, and rape, which occurred in furtherance
of forced labor, likewise do not require a claim of state action.248 Even though
the court dispensed with the state action requirement, it still needed to evaluate
whether Unocal should be held liable for the Myanmar military's actions, and if
so, under what standard.2 49 The court found that because forced labor is ajus
cogens violation, an international standard of liability is preferable to a
domestic one. 250  The court reasoned that an international standard was
appropriate because "the law of any particular state is either identical to thejus
cogens norms of international law, or it is invalid., 25 1 Whatever the merits of
this assertion, it does not necessarily follow that the aiding and abetting of
forced labor is the appropriate standard of liability. That a particular norm is
jus cogens does not also define the scope of liability under that norm. The
court continued, arguing that "reading § 1350 as essentially a jurisdictional
grant only and then looking to [foreign or] domestic tort law to provide the
cause of action mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort."
252 The
Ninth Circuit, having already held that the ATS creates a cause of action in
addition to its jurisdictional grant,253 implied that because the substantive
244. Id. at 938-39.
245. Id. at 939.
246. Id. at 943.
247. Id. at 946.
248. Id. at 953-54.
249. See Collingsworth, supra note 221, at 200 (noting that "[m]anagers and other
decision-makers for MNC defendants will almost never pull the trigger or wield the machete
themselves").
250. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that where only
jus cogens violations are alleged, it may be preferable to apply international law rather than the
law of any particular state), reh 'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995)).
253. Id. at 948-49.
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violation originates from the law of nations, the standard of liability should as
well.25 4 This argument, however, has been dealt a significant blow by Sosa,
which held that the ATS is solely jurisdictional and that the federal common
law supplies the cause of action, based upon the law of nations, in limited
cases.255 Federal common law should also supply the standard of liability.
Whether this standard derives as well from the law of nations remains to be
seen.
Favoring an international standard, the Ninth Circuit held that the
international criminal standard of aiding and abetting applied to determine
Unocal's liability under the ATS 6 To determine the scope of aiding and
abetting for ATS purposes, the court looked to the recent decisions by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).257 Realizing that it might
be controversial to apply a criminal standard to a civil proceeding, the court
reasoned that "what is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort in another
jurisdiction, and this distinction is therefore of little help in ascertaining the
standards of international human rights law. 2 58 Moreover, the court found that
the international criminal standard for aiding and abetting is similar to the
domestic tort law standard, thus making the distinction less relevant in the ATS
context.259 The fear among MNCs is that the use of the aiding and abetting
254. Id. at 949.
255. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761 (2004) (finding the ATS is a
jurisdictional statute and that the common law will provide the cause of action for a limited
number of international law violations).
256. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Unocal
may be liable under the ATS for aiding and abetting the Myanmar military), reh'g granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
257. Id. at 949-50.
258. See id. at 949 (noting that international human rights law has developed mostly in the
criminal context).
259. Id. As to the actus reus of the offense, the court held that aiding and abetting applied
to "practical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of
the crime." Id. at 951. Citing to the ICTY, the court did not find that assistance must constitute
an indispensable element, but rather that the actions "make a significant difference to the
commission of the criminal act by the principal." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Under the
international standard, moral support is an option along with practical assistance and
encouragement, and even though the court decided not to adopt this part of the standard, it did
suggest moral support may be used to establish liability. Id. at 951 n.28. As to the mens rea,
the court held that the defendant must have "actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge
that the accomplice's actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime." Id. at
956. Thus, the accomplice does not need to share the perpetrator's mens rea; the accomplice
need not even know "the precise crime the principal intends to commit." Id. at 950.
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standard facilitates more tenuous claims by lowering the liability standard,260
and thereby creates more uncertainty as to when MNCs are engaged in a
situation that could give rise to liability.
In his concurrence to Unocal, Judge Reinhardt disagreed with the
majority's use of the aiding and abetting standard; he argued that no
international standards should be used to determine third-party liability under
the ATS.2 6' In rejecting the use of an international standard, Reinhardt asserted
that federal common law applies when courts must implement the policies
underlying a federal statute, particularly when the statute has left legal issues
unaddressed. 262  Additionally, Reinhardt found that assessing third-party
liability "is a straightforward legal matter that federal courts routinely resolve
using common law principles. ',263 That some of the underlying acts occurred in
another country should not change this. 264 Reinhardt distinguished applying
international law to the substantive violation from applying such law to
ancillary questions such as third-party liability, which are best left to the federal
common law. 265 Reinhardt indicated that his aversion to using the international
standard stems, in part, from the belief that the aiding and abetting principle is
relatively undeveloped and has only been promulgated by recent "ad hoc
international tribunal[s]" (ICTY and ICTR). 266 He reasoned that "certainty,
260. See Collingsworth, supra note 221, at 200 (finding it crucial to adopt the aiding and
abetting principle for ATS cases because otherwise "companies will be free to enter into
business relationships with rogue governments and provide support to activities that violate
human rights while avoiding liability"); JOSEPH, supra note 25, at 49 (stating that the aiding and
abetting test imposes higher liability than the "active participation" test, which the district court
applied).
261. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 963 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (disagreeing that the "recently-promulgated" aiding and abetting standard should be
applied to assess Unocal's liability and finding that no international law test should be used to
determine such liability), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
262. See id. at 965-66 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (discussing the role of federal common
law in implementing statutes (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100-04
(1972))).
263. Id. at 966 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
264. See id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (noting that transnational matters increasingly are
being litigated in federal courts using federal legal standards); see also id. at 968 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the issue of establishing third-party liability is not at all unique to
human rights litigation and thus finding no reason to look to international law when a
substantial amount of federal common law already exists addressing third-party liability).
265. See id. at 966 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (finding that there is no "reason to apply
international law to the question of third party liability simply because international law applies
to the substantive violation").
266. See id. at 967 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (arguing that the benefits of the experience
of the federal common law are lost when such a wide body of reasoning and authority is
abandoned for "an undeveloped principle of international law").
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predictability and uniformity of result are more likely to be achieved when there
exists extensive precedent upon which to draw, and the state of the law does
not depend on the future decisions of some as-yet unformed international
tribunal established to deal with other unique regional conflicts.,
' 267
Although the Sosa decision did not address liability issues, the Supreme
Court required a high standard for any international norm to be actionable
under the ATS, and clearly not every customary international norm will
qualify.268 The majority's discussion in Unocal, however, did not establish that
aiding and abetting has achieved even customary international law status.269
The Unocal court found that the ICTY and ICTR were but one source of
relevant international law, rather than a primary source. 270 The court did not
address what the other sources were or whether those sources demonstrated that
aiding and abetting has received the general consent of states and is followed
out of a sense of legal obligation. Under the Sosa standard, courts should not
apply a liability standard that has not been established as customary
international law, and even then, courts may find the standard less widely
accepted and well defined than Sosa demands. The Sosa standard is too
cautious and narrow to permit uncertain norms of international law to guide the
analysis in an ATS suit. The Sosa decision further demonstrated that even if an
international norm has been accepted as a part of federal common law, it does
not necessarily follow that such a norm is applicable to the ATS. 271 The en
banc panel that reheard the Unocal case even suggested that the aiding and
abetting standard has not reached federal common law status.
272
The Apartheid Litigation court explicitly rejected the aiding and abetting
standard, finding little evidence that it is universally accepted as a legal
267. See id. at 967 (suggesting that in contrast to the aiding and abetting principle, the
federal common law principles ofjoint liability, agency, and reckless disregard are well known).
268. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,2761 (2004) (finding that the common
law will "provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations").
269. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 951 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
court's opinion has not found the criminal tribunals' standard to be the controlling international
law and further stating that the tribunals are "helpful for ascertaining the current standard for
aiding and abetting"), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
270. Id.
271. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 n.19 (finding that the ATS "was enacted on the
congressional understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some
common law claims derived from the law of nations") (emphasis added).
272. See Jill Meyers, Ninth Circuit Grants En Banc Rehearing in Doe v. Unocal, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 757, 764 (2004) (noting that "[a]t least half of the panelists at the en banc
hearing expressed discomfort in applying the international aiding and abetting standard until
federal common law status is achieved").
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obligation.273 The court disagreed that the ICTY, ICTR, or Nuremberg
tribunals established a clearly defined norm for ATS purposes under the Sosa
standard.274 The Apartheid Litigation court declined to follow a recent case in
the Southern District of New York which did find the aiding and abetting
standard to be actionable in ATS cases.275 The earlier case, however, was
decided prior to the Sosa decision, and like Unocal, was based upon the ATS
providing a cause of action under international law.276 The Sosa Court not only
rejected that the ATS provides a cause of action, but also limited the actionable
norms to a narrow class.277 Thus, it is not obvious, as the Southern District
argued,278 that international law will guide the courts in the liability analysis.
The federal common law instead should provide the appropriate guidance.279
As discussed above in this Part, using federal common law does not foreclose
the application of international standards, but international standards must first
reach the Sosa Court's universal acceptance and specificity standards before
application under the ATS is appropriate.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has directly addressed the importation of
the criminal standard of aiding and abetting into civil liability cases. In a suit
involving claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court found
that "when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover
damages from a private defendant for the defendant's violation of some
statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue
aiders and abettors. 280 Moreover, even though aiding and abetting exists in
273. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(finding that plaintiffs failed to establish aiding and abetting international law violations to be a
universally accepted legal obligation).
274. Id. at 549-50.
275. See id. at 550 (declining to follow the decision in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which upheld aiding and
abetting under the ATS).
276. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,320
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting Talisman's argument that aiding and abetting is not actionable, in
part because the ATS provides a cause of action for breaches of international law).
277. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,2764 (2004) (finding that the ATS is
"open to a narrow class of international norms today").
278. See Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d, at 320 (finding that because courts look to
international law to find an ATS cause of action, the same applies in determining whether aiding
and abetting is recognized under the ATS).
279. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754 (finding that the ATS was intended to enable "federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at
common law") (emphasis added).
280. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
182 (1994).
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criminal law, a civil standard does not necessarily follow. 281 Although the Sosa
Court did not find the criminal/civil distinction dispositive for determining
appropriate causes of action,282 it is unlikely, given the Court's narrow
standard, that it intended a complete blurring of civil and criminal legal
standards. Congress has enacted legislation that applies the aiding and abetting
standards to all federal crimes,283 but no such statute has been enacted
applicable to civil litigation. M Some have argued that importing criminal
standards into the ATS poses few problems because the standard used in
criminal cases is much stricter than the one applied in civil cases.285 This
argument appears to confuse the relevant standards being compared. Certainly
the burden of proof in criminal cases (beyond a reasonable doubt) is much
higher than in civil cases (preponderance of the evidence), but that is different
from the applicable standards of liability. A broad standard of liability, such as
aiding and abetting, may be more appropriate in criminal cases because the
burden of proof is much higher. Importing a broad criminal standard into civil
litigation, without congressional guidance, may unjustly expand the scope of
liability, especially considering the lower burden of proof in civil cases. It is
unwarranted to assume that any criminal standard is equally applicable in civil
suits. The Supreme Court has recognized aspects of the concert of action tort
principle as roughly equivalent to criminal aiding and abetting,286 but the Court
also found this doctrine to be uncertain in application at best.287 Given that the
Sosa decision emphasized deference to congressional guidance when
generating federal common law, the lower courts should not apply either the
aiding and abetting standard or its civil equivalent. Neither is well established
281. See id. at 190 (noting also that the Court has been reluctant to infer a private right of
action from a criminal prohibition alone).
282. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2760-61 (finding that even though Blackstone's offenses were
described in criminal terms, this did not prevent appropriate civil sanctions).
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that whoever aids or abets the commission of a
criminal offense is liable as a principal).
284. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 182.
285. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 223, at 1385 (noting that if a party can be convicted under
a criminal standard, "it would seem paradoxical not to hold that same party responsible for the
same actions under the less rigorous civil standard").
286. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
181 (1994). Under concert of action, "[a]n actor is liable for harm resulting to a third person
from the tortious conduct of another if he.. . knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other." Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977)) (internal quotations omitted).
287. Id. The Court also noted that some states do not even recognize liability as set forth
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(b). See id. at 182-83 (noting several
states that do not recognize the aiding and abetting tort).
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in federal common law, and to apply such standards would impose an
expansive interpretation upon the ATS when Sosa demands a narrow One.
C. Standard Tort Principles
The Sosa decision did not infer any sort of deferential stance towards
international law. Importing international standards, beyond the narrow class
of violations suggested by Sosa, risks turning "the federal courts into
international tribunals that happen to be located within the United States."
288
Such an expansion of the federal judiciary is questionable in the absence of
congressional intent, especially considering the potential negative foreign
policy consequences that such an expansion may entail. 289 Federal courts must
look to international law when determining what norms are actionable under
the ATS, as § 1350 permits jurisdiction over torts committed in violation of the
law of nations. 290 No such gap, however, exists with standards of tort
liability.291 As Judge Reinhardt concluded in Unocal, there is little "reason to
look to international criminal law doctrines for a civil liability standard when a
substantial body of federal common law already exists regarding third-party
liability."292 Lower courts should therefore follow the model advocated by
Judge Reinhardt when extending liability under the ATS and apply traditional
federal common law tort principles. Such an approach eradicates any chance of
violating Sosa's high standard for incorporating international law into ATS
jurisprudence. Moreover, there is no need to incorporate international liability
standards into the ATS. Although the Unocal majority viewed applying
ordinary tort law as muting "the grave international law aspect of the tort, 293
the Sosa Court clarified that the gravity of the breach is not the dispositive
factor in applying international law. 294 The international standards of liability,
288. Shaw, supra note 223, at 1379.
289. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2763 (2004) (stating that "[s]ince
many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international
law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at
all, with great caution").
290. See Shaw, supra note 223, at 1379 (noting that "the United States does not seem to
have a pre-existing definition of what constitutes a justiciable international violation").
291. See id. (finding that there is no gap in United States law regarding doctrines of
responsibility).
292. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932,968 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
293. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 948 (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D.
Mass. 1995)).
294. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct., at 2769 (finding that those who by their actions "become
1265
62 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1219 (2005)
as previously discussed in this Part, have developed in the context of criminal
tribunals. Section 1350, by its language, calls for tort liability. International
law for jus cogens violations has developed in the criminal context on a
relatively ad hoc basis, whereas common law tort principles have been
developing steadily and regularly for over two hundred years in the United
States. Moreover, no comparable system of tort law exists in international law.
As discussed above in this Part, agency law should be applied when
analyzing corporate liability under the ATS, but its scope is limited to direct
violations by an MNC. Common law tort principles such as joint venture
liability and reckless disregard are appropriate in determining the third-party
liability of MNCs who do not themselves (through their agents), commit
actionablejus cogens violations.
A joint venture contains four elements as described by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group;
(2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community of
pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and (4) an equal
right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right
of control.295
An MNC can be liable for thejus cogens violations of any of its coventurers if
a plaintiff can prove all four of the above criteria. MNCs have been very
concerned about liability under the ATS for simply doing business with those
who commit violations or merely by investing in a country whose government
is committing violations.296 If MNCs could, in fact, be liable under the ATS for
such tenuous connections to human rights perpetrators, such concerns would be
justified, as this could have drastic consequences for the flow of international
commerce. Under joint venture liability, however, MNCs will not incur
liability solely based upon with whom and where they transact business. Joint
venture liability is similar to partnership law which holds partners liable for the
wrongful acts of other partners acting within the ordinary course of the
partnership.297 Just as a partner is an agent of the partnership, 298 a joint
enemies of the human race" do not necessarily violate an actionable ATS norm).
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (1965).
296. Rivera, supra note 13, at 259.
297. See UNIF. P'sfIP ACT § 305(a) (1994) (stating that "[a] partnership is liable for loss or
injury caused to a person... as a result of a wrongful act or omission, or other actionable
conduct, or a partner acting in the ordinary course of business of the partnership"); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmts. b, d (1965) (noting that a partnership is a joint
enterprise, but that joint enterprise is a broader term than partnership).
298. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301(1) (1994) (stating that "each partner is an agent of the
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venturer is an agent of the joint venture. 299 Following the principles of agency
law, a joint venturer will be liable only for those torts that are committed within
the scope of the joint venture's common purpose.300 This limiting principle
combined with the fourth element ofjoint ventures, the equal right of control in
the direction of the venture, insures that MNCs will not be liable for violations
beyond their control or for those to which an MNC is only connected through a
common transaction. Jus cogens human rights violations tend to occur in
underdeveloped countries run by dictatorial governments. Under such
conditions, MNCs may not often have an equal voice in the scope or direction
of a particular project even though they are benefiting economically. But when
MNCs do possess equal control over the venture, they should be held liable for
jus cogens violations.
The tort principle of reckless disregard applies when an actor acts or, if
there is a duty to act, intentionally fails to act "in the face of an unjustifiably
high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.
30 1
Agency law, as discussed above in this Part, ascribes strict liability to
employers for their employee-agents' torts only when the employer controls the
method of the agents' performance within the scope of the employment,
302
whereas independent contractors are ordinarily responsible for their own
303torts. Reckless disregard will expand this scope of liability. This expansion
could be common for MNCs in the context of who they hire and how those
agents are monitored. An MNC can be liable for an employee's torts that are
outside the scope of employment and for the torts of an independent contractor
if the MNC recklessly hires a person or entity that it knows or should know is
likely to commitjus cogens violations of international law.304 Likewise, if an
partnership for the purpose of its business").
299. See PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS, supra note 205, at 674 (declaring that
"each member of a joint enterprise is held to be an agent of the other; each may therefore be
held liable for the acts of the other").
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (stating that a master is
liable for his agents' torts committed in the scope of the employment).
301. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 500 (1965) (defining reckless disregard of safety).
302. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-220 (1958) (stating that masters
(employers) are liable for the torts of their servants (employees) when the master controls the
physical conduct in the performance of the services).
303. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (distinguishing between
servants (employees) and independent contractors).
304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1958) (stating that a master can
be liable for the torts of employees outside of scope of employment if the master is reckless); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965) (describing standard for reckless
disregard).
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MNC recklessly fails to monitor or oversee those agents that it knows or should
know are committingjus cogens violations, the MNC can and should be held
liable. MNCs cannot hide behind willful blindness.
These common law tort principles are not intended to be an exhaustive list
of the possible liability standards applicable in ATS suits. Others such as
action in concert305 and directing the conduct of another 30 6 may be valid
principles to hold MNCs liable in connection withjus cogens offenses. The
conclusion, rather, is that well-established common law tort standards are more
appropriate than less certain international or criminal doctrines of liability as
those doctrines are applied in the area of civil liability. When determining
which common law tort principles to apply, lower courts should be guided by
the legitimate concerns of MNCs-that they not be held liable for merely
investing or doing business in a particular country or for transacting with a
particular entity. While human rights advocates may wish to go this far, this
kind of liability will likely lead to the negative foreign policy consequences that
the Sosa Court sought to avoid. Such liability could severely curtail the
economic development of some countries where MNCs find it too risky to do
business. Although this limits accountability, the Sosa decision, with its
concern for collateral foreign policy issues, has implied that it is not the role of
the federal judiciary to impose this level of accountability, but rather that of the
political branches of the government.
VII. Conclusion
Human rights advocates want more accountability. MNCs want less
liability or at least clearer guidance on when they can or cannot be liable under
the ATS. Both sides claim victory in the wake of Sosa. 30 7 What has Sosa
delivered? The Sosa decision, while addressing some core issues, has left
many questions unanswered. The Court delineated a standard for choosing
actionable norms, but it did not provide the lower courts with much practical
guidance in applying this standard. In light of the Court's demand for universal
acceptance and relative specificity, the modem international law concept of/us
cogens provides the best organizing principle for actionable ATS norms. The
305. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
306. See generally id. § 877.
307. See Jonathan Birchall, The Questions over Aiding andAbetting: Alien Tort Statute:
An Oil Company's Fight with the Human Rights Lobby Tests an 18th Century Law, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2004, at 9 (noting that Amnesty International feels that the Court in Sosa upheld the
ATS's core principles while representatives of Unocal, the subject of a current ATS suit, believe
Sosa soundly rejected how the lower courts have expanded the reading of the ATS).
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norms against genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, piracy, slavery,
torture, and extrajudicial killings all are universally prohibited and have core
definitions to which the international community has agreed. By limiting the
ATS to jus cogens norms, lower courts can ensure less encroachment upon
Congress's right to permit and define private rights of action;jus cogens norms,
because of their universal character, are less apt to engender controversy.
Likewise, collateral effects upon foreign policy are less likely under a jus
cogens cause of action. All international law contrary to jus cogens is, by
definition, invalid.3°8 Certainly, enforcing civil liability against those entities
that choose to disregard binding international law may well engender
international conflicts, but under Sosa, the lower courts have the authority and,
indeed, a mandate to dismiss such cases that may run counter to the executive
and legislative branches' foreign policy goals.
The Sosa opinion failed to address questions of who can be sued under the
ATS, but the lower federal courts have regularly exercised subject matter
jurisdiction over corporations. Unless the Court or Congress directs otherwise,
the lower courts should continue to allow corporations to be sued forjus cogens
violations. Although corporations, or any nonstate entity for that matter, do not
have the same rights as states to make treaties and consent to the customary
practice of international law, they still have certain rights and duties under
international law.309 To be free from brutality no matter the identity of the
perpetrator is the essence of human rights law. International law has not
progressed to the stage at which all violations are actionable against all
individuals and entities. Within the realm ofjus cogens norms, however, any
individual or corporation should, under appropriate common law principles of
agency or tort law, be held liable when the requisite state has also acted.
Legally, neither domestic nor international law has granted corporations any
general immunity from suit, as corporations have the same rights of individuals
to sue and be sued.31 ° Moreover, from a public policy standpoint, corporations
have the power to bring dramatic changes to societies and cultures-both
negative and positive. It would be a mistake to withhold liability from such a
powerful section of society. Obviously, this power can generate foreign policy
concerns that, as the Sosa Court found, deserve serious consideration on a case-
308. See WALLACE, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that a treaty that conflicts with ajus
cogens principle is void).
309. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 445 (discussing the role of individuals in international
law enforcement).
310. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 3.02 (1997) (stating that "every corporation...
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its
business and affairs, including without limitation power.., to sue and be sued").
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by-case basis. The federal judiciary, however, has plenty of options with which
to dismiss otherwise valid suits under the ATS, including forum non
conveniens, the act of state doctrine, and the political question doctrine. These
options provide the safety valve that Sosa suggested, so that the judiciary does
not interfere with the foreign policy prerogatives of the political branches of
government. Moreover, the ability to dismiss a case when appropriate gives the
lower courts the freedom to develop an ATS jurisprudence related to
corporations within the limited class ofjus cogens violations. MNCs should
therefore assess their liability risk around the jus cogens principle and their
relation to a violation through standard agency and tort law principles.
Predicting how and when lower courts will decide the relative weight of a
particular foreign policy consideration is uncertain and risky at best.
Ultimately, the best outcome would be for Congress to step in and clarify the
scope of the ATS and definitively answer the following questions: What
international law norms can be litigated and how are those norms to be defined?
Who can be sued? How far does liability extend? But until Congress acts or
the Supreme Court more definitively addresses the ATS, the lower courts will
be left with the Sosa decision. If the lower federal courts follow the proposals
in this Note, the ATS jurisprudence will develop more consistently, with
increased fidelity to the principles laid out in Sosa.
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